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Article 4

Controlling Conflicts of Interest: A Tale of Two
Industries
Ahmed E. Taha*

I. INTRODUCTION

A
Increasing conglomeration is occurring in many industries.
conglomerate can have synergies between its businesses, which allow
the production of better goods or services or lower prices.' However,
conglomeration can also create conflicts of interest within a corporation,
resulting in harm to consumers.
For example, the public spotlight has recently focused on the
conflicts of interest faced by research analysts who work for financial
institutions that also have investment banking departments. Investors
rely on research analysts for investment advice. 2 Many of these
research analysts work for brokerage firms and write research reports
regarding various companies for the brokerages' clients and other
investors. 3 A research report contains facts and opinions about the
company that is the subject of the report, and is typically accompanied
* Assistant Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. J.D., Ph.D. Stanford
University, 1996; B.A., B.S. University of Pennsylvania, 1988. I am grateful for the very helpful
comments of Jonathan Adler, Bill Black, Anne Brumbaugh, Daylian Cain, Stephen Choi, David
Freedman, Michael Green, Mitu Gulati, Don Moore, Andrew Morriss, Alan Palmiter, Robert
Rosen, Hillary Sale, Richard Schneider, Ronald Wright, and faculty workshops at Case Western
Reserve Law School, Florida State Law School, Wake Forest Law School, the Babcock Graduate
School of Management, and the Law and Society Association Annual Conference. I also
appreciate the excellent research assistance of Wesley Bullock, John Coyle, Kara Freiden,
Michelle Green, Sally Kirby, Damien Savoie, and Edward Wyatt.
1. Thomas Ruffner, The Failed GE/Honeywell Merger: The Return of Portfolio-Effects

Theory?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1285, 1318 (2003).
2.

Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation

of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1079 (2003) ("Investors rely on analyst research, in part,
because they believe that analysts have both superior information and an incentive to convey that
information to the marketplace accurately.").
3. Id. at 1041. These research analysts are called "sell-side analysts." Id. There are also "buyside analysts" who are employed by institutions that invest money, such as mutual funds and
pension funds.

U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

ANALYZING ANALYST

RECOMMENDATIONS, June 20, 2002, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/analysts.htm.
analysts have the conflicts of interest that are the focus of this Article.

Sell-side
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by a recommendation
regarding whether the company's stock is a good
4
investment.
Although investors
expected to receive
unbiased stock
recommendations from research analysts, these analysts often faced

great pressure to give positive recommendations of companies' stocks
to help their firms secure investment banking business from those
companies. 5 As a result, research analysts often gave biased investment

advice, causing "untold millions of individual investors [to lose] vast
sums of money." 6 In response to this bias, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), other regulatory organizations and consent decrees

approved by courts have recently imposed billions of dollars in fines
and civil settlements in addition to a number of rules and regulations on
research analysts and their employers. 7 These reforms are targeted at
reducing and publicly disclosing analysts' conflict of interests.

Media conglomeration can cause similar problems.

For example,

there is fear that news outlets that are part of conglomerates will be

reluctant to report unflattering news-or overeager to report positive
news--regarding their corporate parent. 8 In addition, for publicity, the
products of one of a conglomerate's subsidiaries may be unduly
featured in the conglomerate's media outlets. 9 This Article examines

another area in which media conglomeration creates significant
conflicts of interest: a number of media conglomerates own both movie
studios and media outlets that review movies. 10 As a result, many
prominent movie critics now regularly review movies distributed by
4. Fisch & Sale, supra note 2, at 1040-41.
5. David Schepp, Wall Street Analysts Under Fire, BBC NEWS, June 14, 2001, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/1387192.stm.
6. Hearing on Corporate Governance Before the S. Comm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce, and Tourism, 107th Cong. 9 (2002) [hereinafter Spitzer Testimony] (statement of
Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General, State of New York) (testifying that "investment advice has been
compromised by a desire to win investment banking clients."), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/062602spitzer.pdf.
7. See infra Part I for a description of these reforms.
8. Dmitri Williams, Synergy Bias: Conglomerates and Promotion in the News, 46 J.
BROADCASTING & ELECTRONIC MEDIA 453, 453 (2002).
9. Allison Fass, Two Cable Networks Cooperate in a Bid to Cut Through Clutter, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2002, at C5 (discussing cross-promotions by cable television channels, A&E and The
Weather Channel, which are both partially owned by Disney); Steve Johnson, A Tangled Web,
CHI. TRIB., July 7, 2002, at C1 (noting cross-promotions by AOL and Time Magazine following
the merger of AOL and Time Warner); Reporters Rap Commercial Plugs in Broadcast News,
O'DWYER'S PR SERVICES REPORT, Jan. 1997, at 14 (discussing "plugging" of Fox movies and
television programs by Fox News).
10. The Columbia Journalism Review maintains a list of the businesses owned by major
media companies.
Who Owns What, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv., Dec. 14, 2005,
http://www.cjr.org/tools/owners/index.asp.
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subsidiaries of the parent companies of the critics' employers.
Similar to users of research analysts' stock recommendations,
see. 1 1
consumers use critics' movie reviews to decide which movies to
Thus the potential for bias in movie reviews is strong. For example, the
movie critics and editors of Entertainment Weekly likely understand that
Time Warner-EntertainmentWeekly's and Warner Brothers Pictures'
parent company----financially benefits from a favorable review by
Entertainment Weekly of a Warner Brothers film.
This Article empirically examines whether these conflicts of interest
result in biased movie reviews. It finds that these movie critics' reviews
are generally unbiased despite these conflicts of interest. Thus, critics
working for some of the largest corporations in the country are able to
maintain their objectivity even when doing so hurts their parent
companies financially. This finding stands in stark contrast to the
systematic bias exhibited by research analysts who issue reports on
companies from which their employers seek investment banking
business.
This finding also raises an important question: why do some conflicts
of interest (like those facing research analysts in large financial
conglomerates) result in biased opinions and harm to consumers, while
others (like those facing movie critics in large media conglomerates) do
not? Differences in the structure of the organizations in which movie
critics and research analysts work, and differences in the direct financial
incentives facing movie critics and research analysts are responsible for
the different outcomes.
This conclusion has important implications for policymakers seeking
to control conflicts of interest. For example, many of the recent reforms
directed at research analysts should create an organizational structure
and financial incentives more like those experienced by movie critics,
thus this Article provides empirical support for inferring that some of
these reforms will significantly reduce research analysts' bias. Other
reforms, however, such as those mandating disclosure of analysts'
conflicts of interest, are unnecessary; movie critics do not disclose their
conflicts of interest, yet they do not produce biased reviews.
Policymakers interested in controlling particular conflicts of interest
should focus on eliminating or reducing the conflicts of interest rather
than on requiring public disclosure of the conflicts. Indeed, recent
11. People may also use reviews of a movie for help in understanding elements of the movie,
to reinforce their own opinion of the film, and to be able to discuss the movie with other people
more intelligently. Bruce Austin, A Longitudinal Test of the Taste Culture and Elitist
Hypotheses, 10 J. POPULAR FILM & TELEVISION 156, 158 (1983).
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research finds that requiring disclosure of conflicts of interest can
actually be harmful to those who receive the disclosure.
Part II of this Article describes the organizational and incentive
structure in which movie critics operate and the resulting conflicts of
interest they face. 12 Part III discusses the organizational and incentive
structure in which research analysts have operated, the resulting
conflicts of interest and the bias caused by these conflicts, and how
recent reforms attempt to address these conflicts. 13 The empirical
assessment of whether movie critics' conflicts of interest result in
biased movie reviews is set out in Part IV. 14 Part V discusses the
lessons regarding controlling conflicts of interest that can be learned
from the behavior of movie critics and
research analysts.1 5 Part VI
16
summarizes and concludes the Article.
II. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FACING MOVIE CRITICS
Conglomeration and consolidation in the media has created enormous
media giants that are among the world's largest corporations. For
example, Time Warner Inc. is the world's largest media and
entertainment company, and ranks thirty-second in the Fortune 500,17
with revenue of almost $44 billion in 2005.18 Among its most-well
known operations are the Internet service provider America Online;
Time Warner Cable; the CNN cable channel; popular magazines such as
Time, People, Entertainment Weekly; and the production and
distribution of films through businesses including Warner Brothers

Pictures. 19
Similarly, The Walt Disney Company, the second largest media and
entertainment conglomerate, had almost $32 billion in revenue in fiscal
year 2005, 2 0 and ranks fifty-fourth in the Fortune 500.21 Among its
12. See infra Part I (examining three media conglomerates and how favorable movie reviews

can increase their profits).
13. See infra Part II (describing bias in research analyst reports and discussing the subsequent
legislation and regulation).
14. See infra Part IV (presenting empirical analyses demonstrating that movie critics do not
exhibit a systematic bias in favor of affiliated movies).
15. See infra Part V (concluding that bias is attributable to financial incentives and lack of
independence, but that disclosure is ineffective in reducing bias).
16. See infra Part VI (arguing that policymakers should focus on reducing the existence of
conflicts of interest, rather than publicly disclosing them).
17. Ranked Within Industries, FORTUNE, Apr. 18, 2005, at F46.
18. Time Warner Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 253 (Feb. 27, 2006).
19. Who Owns What, supra note 10.
20. Disney's fiscal year ends on October 1. The Walt Disney Co., Annual Report (Form 10K), at 76 (Dec. 7, 2005).
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most well known media operations are the ABC television network; the
ESPN cable channel; and the production and distribution of movies
through studios including
Walt Disney Pictures, Touchstone Pictures,
22
and Miramax Films.
The News Corporation Limited is an international media
conglomerate headed by Rupert Murdoch with almost $24 billion in
revenue in fiscal year 2005, 2 3 ranking ninety-eighth in the Fortune
500.24 Among its businesses are the Fox News Channel; a large number
of newspapers; and the production and distribution of movies2 5through
its 20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight Pictures subsidiaries.
The large size and scope of such conglomerates has raised concerns.
Many fear that news outlets owned by a conglomerate will not fully
cover stories that generate negative publicity for their corporate parent,
and will give too much coverage to stories that give positive publicity to
it. 26 For example, ABC News may be reluctant to report on the
newsworthy problems at The Walt Disney Company because Disney
owns ABC. Such reluctance would decrease the quality of the news
that viewers receive.
Indeed, the behavior of these conglomerates indicates that they use
some of their businesses to maximize the profits of their other
businesses. For instance, they use their media outlets to promote the
products and services produced by other companies within the
For example, ABC's Good Morning America
conglomerate.2 7
television show covered Disney World's twenty-fifth anniversary for
which included an interview of then-Disney CEO Michael
two hours,
28
Eisner.
Many media conglomerates have another way to increase their
profits. These conglomerates own both movie studios and major media
outlets that review movies. For example, The Walt Disney Company
owns Walt Disney Pictures and other movie studios and also owns
Buena Vista Television, the distributor of the popular Ebert & Roeper
and the Movies (Ebert & Roeper) television program, which each week
21. Ranked Within Industries,supra note 17.
22. Who Owns What, supra note 10.
23. News Corporation's fiscal year ends on June 30. News Corp., Annual Report (Form 10K), at 125 (Sept. 1, 2005).
24. Ranked Within Industries,supra note 17.
25. Who Owns What, supra note 10.
26. Williams, supra note 8, at453.
27. See supra note 9 (detailing various sources outlining how media conglomerates crosspromote among their various media sections).
28. Williams, supra note 8, at453.
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features movie critics Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper reviewing
movies. 29 Ebert & Roeper appears on more than 200 television stations
and is the30 "top-rated first-run weekly syndicated half-hour on
television."
The world's largest media company, Time Warner Inc., owns movie
studios such as Warner Brothers Pictures and magazines that review
In
movies, including Entertainment Weekly, Time, and People.3 '
addition, The News Corporation Limited produces and distributes
movies through its 20th Century Fox and Fox Searchlight Pictures
subsidiaries 32 and owns media outlets, 33such as the New York Post
newspaper, that regularly review movies.
Because consumers use critics' reviews to decide which movies to
see, 34 if the conglomerate's media outlets give positive reviews of
movies distributed by the conglomerate's movie studios, then the
studios' profits will increase. Thus, these movie critics face a conflict
of interest creating the potential for bias in their movie reviews:
although readers of their reviews expect the critics' sincere opinions
about the movies, these critics can financially benefit their affiliated
studios by giving positive reviews to movies distributed by those
studios.
There is much evidence that studios greatly value positive reviews.
Most studies have found that favorable movie reviews result in more
people seeing a movie than do unfavorable reviews. 35 Even positive
reviews from individual critics can have a significant effect on a
movie's success. For example, having a movie receive a "thumbs up"
from Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper is "worth millions to the
studios.""
29. Id.
30. Ebert & Roeper, MOVIES.COM, http://tvplex.go.com/buenavista/ebertandroeper/
bios/ebert.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006).
31. Who Owns What: Time Warner, supra note 10.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Austin, supra note 11, at 158.
35. See Suman Basuroy, Subimal Chatterjee, S. Abraham Ravid, How Critical are Critical
Reviews? The Box Office Effects of Film Critics, Star-Power, and Budgets, 67 J. MARKETING
103, 107 (2003) (citing studies and discussing film critics' influence on box office revenue);
David A. Reinstein & Christopher M. Snyder, The Influence of Expert Reviews on Consumer
Demandfor Experience Goods: A Case Study of Movie Critics, 53 J. INDUS. ECON. 27, 29 (2005)
(finding a positive relationship between favorable reviews and box office revenue); cf. S.
Abraham Ravid, Information, Blockbusters, and Stars: A Study of the Film Industry, 72 J. Bus.

463, 482 (1999) (finding that positive reviews do not significantly affect the revenue earned by a
movie).
36. Lorenza Munoz, Credibility on the High Seas, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2002, at F10.
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Critics' reviews can significantly impact the success of even the most
heavily advertised films, especially if critics state that such a movie
goes beyond typical expectations for movies of that genre.3 7 For
example, movies including Men in Black, Saving Private Ryan, Scream,
and The Terminator, were transformed from being "hits" to being

"mega-hits" by critics informing moviegoers that these hit movies were
38

also actually good movies.
Also, the behavior of movie studios clearly demonstrates that studios
believe that positive reviews are important. Advertising for movies

routinely contains favorable quotes from critics. Positive statements
from well-known critics, such as Roger Ebert, are featured especially
prominently in advertising. 39 Studios also sometimes eliminate or delay
advance screenings of a movie 40
for critics if the studios believe that the
movie will receive bad reviews.
In addition, studios have misused movie reviews in advertising

movies. In 2001, two Sony advertising executives were suspended for
thirty days when it was discovered that Sony had created quotes from a

fictitious movie critic to use in advertisements for four movies of
"questionable-quality:" The Animal, Hollow Man, A Knight's Tale, and
Vertical Limit.4 1 Many in the movie industry feared that this
transgression would result in governmental regulation. 42 However, the

37. David Shaw, Thumbs Up or Down on Movie Critics?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1999, at Al.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Dade Hayes, Two Thumbs Way Up!, VARIETY, Jan. 5, 2004, at 11 (noting that
Newmarket, the distributor of the movie Monster, which starred actress Charlize Theron,
"plastered Roger Ebert's rave-'[Charlize Theron gives o]ne of the best performances in the
history of cinema'-all over print ads"); Richard Natale, When His Thumb Turned, Millions Got
the Message; Responding to Movies Like a Couple of Guys at the Water Cooler, Siskel and Ebert
GainedPower in Hollywood Marketing Circles, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1999, at Fl (referring to the
Siskel and Ebert television show-the predecessor of Ebert & Roeper-the head of distribution
of Sony Pictures states that "[ilt was always a major plus to get their approval ..... I can't think
of a case where we got two thumbs up that we didn't use it in TV ad spots[]").
40. See, e.g., James Sanford, James Sanford Chooses the Best and Worst Films of 2002,
http://www.interbridge.com/jamessanford/bestof2002.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) (noting that
Warner Brothers canceled advanced critical screenings of The Adventures of Pluto Nash due to
concerns that the movie would receive poor reviews).
41. Robert W. Welkos, Untruths and Consequences, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 2001, at 5;
Emanuella Grinberg, Moviegoers to Settle with Studio After Being Lured by Phony Critic, CNN,
Mar. 9, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com2004/LAW/03/09/phony.critic; Matthew Hays, The Trouble
with
Junkets,
MONTREAL
MIRROR,
June
14,
2001,
http://www.montrealnirror.com/archives/2001/06140l/filml html.
Studios
have
also
misrepresented testimonials from other sources. Four major studios have admitted to using
employees or actors posing as ordinary moviegoers to provide testimonials in advertisements for
certain movies. Welkos, supra. A studio has also constructed a phony fan web site for a movie.
Id.
42. Wayne Friedman, Sony Woes Stir Studio Concerns: Executives Fear an Invitation for
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Federal Trade Commission did not take any action against Sony, citing
higher priorities for the agency and the disciplining effect of the bad
publicity that Sony received from the incident.43
However, Sony did not completely escape direct punishment for its
transgression. Sony settled (for $1.5 million) a class action suit filed on
behalf of persons who allegedly were persuaded by the phony reviews
to see the movies.44 Also, it paid a $326,000 fine to the State of

Connecticut for claiming that the fictitious critic worked for a local
Connecticut newspaper. 4 In addition, it paid $25,000 to the consumer
Department of Justice to
protection and education fund of the
4 6 Oregon
charges.
advertising
settle deceptive
More evidence of the importance of positive reviews is that studios
sometimes misuse excerpts from even legitimate reviews. For example,

advertisements for the movie Hoodlum, starring actor Laurence
Fishburne, quoted Los Angeles Times movie critic David Turan as
having called the movie "[I]rresistible," when actually he had written

that "[e]ven [Laurence Fishburne's] incendiary performance can't ignite
Hoodlum, a would-be gangster epic that generates less heat than a
nickel cigar.... Fishburne's Bumpy is fierce, magnetic, irresistible....
But even this actor... can only do so much."4 7 In 2003, the Federal

Trade Commission began reviewing its ,guidelines regarding how
studios can use reviews to promote movies. 4 " These rules prevent using
part of a review out of context to suggest 49that the critic gave a more

positive review than the critic actually gave.

Regulation Looms, ADVERTISING AGE, June 25, 2001, at 4 (quoting an industry executive
discussing increased scrutiny on the industry's policy of self-regulation).
43. Nat Ives, The U.S. Plans to See if There is Misleading Marketing of Movies, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2003, at C12 (quoting the Federal Trade Commission's Associate Director for
Advertising Practices as explaining that "[w]e get many, many complaints about many issues,
including serious health and safety issues, or significant monetary loss to consumers").
44. Lawrence Van Gelder, Arts, Briefly, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at E2.
45. Andrew Gumbel, Sony Penalisedfor Faking Film 'Blurbs', THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 13,
2002, at 3.
46. Media Release, State of Oregon Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Files Action Against
Sony Pictures for Deceptive Advertising of Movies (Aug. 13, 2001), available at
http://www.doj.state.or.us/releases/rel081301.htm. These Oregon charges also involved Sony's
use of employees posing as ordinary moviegoers to provide testimonials in advertisements for
certain movies. Id.
47. Leora Broydo, (Not Such a) Thriller!, MOTHER JONES, Nov.-Dec. 1997, available at
http://www.motherones.com/new/outfront/1997/l1/broydo.html (describing studios distorting
critic's words in advertisements as "a practice as old as show biz itself").
48. Ives, supra note 43; Pamela McClintock, FTC Reviewing Movie Blurb Guidelines, DAILY
VARIETY, Jan. 10, 2003, at 8.
49. A Federal Trade Commission Advertising Guide warns that "any alteration in or quotation
from the text of the review which does not fairly reflect its substance would be a violation of the
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There is also evidence that studios try to bias the reviews of some

critics.

Studios have sometimes retaliated against critics who have

given particularly bad reviews of the studios' movies. This retaliation
has often taken the form of temporarily banning 50the offending critic
from pre-opening screenings of the studios' movies.

In addition, studios routinely hold press junkets in which reporters
and movie critics are invited to attend the screening of an upcomin
movie and to interview the movie's stars, directors, and/or producers.

The hosting studio often pays for the airfare, expensive hotel rooms,
meals, and even spending money for some critics who attend.52 Man5 3

observers have expressed concern that such payments bias critics.
They point to the fact that press junket attendees are often the source of
the positive blurbs that are featured in advertising for movies that the

vast majority of critics dislike. 54

Indeed, at the junkets, studio

employees sometimes have even tried to get critics who attend to
consent to being quoted
as giving a positive blurb that was actually
55
written by the studio.
In response to these concerns, a consumer group filed a lawsuit
against ten studios that provide such junkets, claiming that the junkets
were in essence payoffs to have the critics write positive reviews of the
standards..... FTC GUIDES CONCERNING USE OF ENDORSEMENTS AND TESTIMONIALS IN
ADVERTISING §255.0(d), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/guides/endorse.htm.
50. Glenn Lovell, Movies and Manipulation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan./Feb. 1993,
http:larchives.cjr.orglyear/97/l1movies.asp. For example, even Roger Ebert and Gene Siskel
were banned from screenings by 20th Century Fox for a couple of weeks because they spoke
badly of the movie Nuns on the Run during their appearance on the Live with Regis and Kathie
Lee television show. Id.
51. Robert W. Welkos & Rachel Abramowitz, Scathing Reviews of Junkets, L.A. TIMES, July
20, 2001, at Al.
52. Hays, supra note 41.
53. Tom Alesia, Film's Press Event Sends Him Reeling, WIS. ST. J., July 12, 2002, at Dl
(wondering, upon seeing rave reviews of a movie by junket attendees, whether "the postscreening party, featuring boomerang-sized shrimp and filet mignon, influence[d] critics
tastes?"); John Horn et al., The Reviewer Who Wasn't There, NEWSWEEK, June 11, 2001, at 8
(referring to the junket circuit as a "scandal" and as a "gravy train where the studios give
journalists free rooms and meals at posh hotels and the reporters return the favor with puffy
celebrity profiles and enthusiastic blurbs"); Dana Kennedy, Where a Nose for News May be Out
of Joint, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2001, at 2A ("[Some] journalists maintain that junket reporters
cannot remain objective."); Welkos & Abramowitz, supra note 51 ("Media critics brand [the
junket attendees] 'blurbmeisters' because the studios often splash quotes from their pieces in
movie ads.").
54. Welkos & Abramowitz, supra note 51.
55'. Roger Ebert, Columbia Fakes it to the Next Level, CHI. SUN TIMES, June 5, 2001, at 35
("In one [documented] case.., a publicist wrote up several 'sample' quotes and asked the
junketeers to sign up for the ones they liked."); Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, President,
Chicago Film Critics Association (Apr. 14, 2004).
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movies. 56 Others have called on the Federal Trade Commission to
investigate the propriety of these junkets.5 7 As a result of such
concerns, critics from major publications generally refuse payments
from studios for attending the junkets, and sometimes their employers
do not even permit them to attend at all.5 8
In Part IV, this Article will empirically examine whether another
source of movie reviews should also treated skeptically: reviews from
59
media outlets affiliated with the studio that distributed the movie.
Indeed, within the community of movie critics, there is awareness of the
60
conflict of interest that critics from such media outlets face.
Even if such bias in movie reviews exists, some observers might be
less concerned if consumers were aware of this conflict of interest.
Then, consumers might be skeptical of reviews from critics affiliated
with the movie's distributor. However, consumers are unlikely to know
that such a conflict of interest exists. To be aware of such a conflict,
consumers would have to know (1) which studio distributes the movie,
(2) the parent company of that studio, and (3) the parent company of the
media outlet that produced the movie review. Although no such study
of consumers' knowledge could be found, the author's personal
experience is that, with the exception of some animated Disney movies,
consumers are generally unaware even of which studios are involved
with particular movies.
Of course, this lack of consumer knowledge could be remedied if the
media outlets that carry reviews disclose to consumers when a conflict
of interest exists. However, no disclosure policy exists for movie
critics. While collecting the data for this Article, no movie review was
found that disclosed the critic's affiliation with the movie's
distributor. 6 1 In addition, as will be discussed later in this Article, other
56. The suit claimed that advertisements using quotes from junket attendees constitute
fraudulent concealment, unfair business practices, and false and misleading advertising, in
violation of California law. Watch Out, David Manning: Blurbmeisters Get Sued, CNN, July 3,
2001, http://archives.cnn.comV20Ol/SHOWBIZtNews/07/03/film.junkets.reut/index.html.
The suit has since been dismissed. Telephone Interview with Anthony Sonnet, plaintiff's lead
attorney (Aug. 3, 2004).
57. Steve Persall, This Column is Wickedly Smart! A Must-Read!, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Feb. 14, 2003, at ID (claiming that "[f]rankly, some movie reviewers' opinions seen in ads are
purchased... [Junket attendees who attend at the studio's expense] know if they keep saying nice
things and doing puff pieces, they'll be invited back[,]" and calling for the Federal Trade

Commission to investigate this phenomenon).
58. Kennedy, supra note 53.
59. See infra Part IV (explaining empirical data demonstrating that movie critics do not

exhibit a systematic bias in favor of affiliated movies).
60. Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 55.
61. In its news stories about Warner Brothers movies, CNN.com-the website of the Cable
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research indicates that disclosure may be unhelpful, and sometimes
even harmful, to consumers.
Like movie critics who work for media conglomerates, research
analysts who work for financial services conglomerates face conflicts of
interest that can bias these analysts' investment recommendations. The
next Part of this Article discusses the conflicts facing these research
analysts, how the conflicts have harmed investors, and how Congress,
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the courts have
attempted to regulate the conflicts.
III. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST FACING RESEARCH ANALYSTS
Research analysts can face significant conflicts of interest. One type
of conflict of interest exists when analysts own stock in the companies
they cover. Because an analyst's recommendation regarding a stock can
cause its price to rise or fall, 62 the analyst has an incentive to
recommend stocks that the analyst owns because the analyst will
personally financially benefit from the price rise.
Research analysts who work for the research department of a
financial conglomerate that has both a research department and an
investment banking department face an additional conflict of interest.
Investors seek the research department's sincere recommendations
regarding the investment potential, or forecasts of the financial
performance, of specific companies. In addition, companies pay for
underwriting and other services provided by the investment banking
department. A conflict of interest exists because a recommendation by
the research department to investors to purchase a stock can help the
research analyst's firm secure investment banking business from the
stock's issuer. 63 Research analysts' compensation was sometimes even
explicitly based upon the
amount of investment banking business the
analyst helped bring in. 64

News Network, which is also owned by Time Warner-discloses its conflicts of interest. For
example, in a news story about the future of the Harry Potter movie series, CNN.com explained
the corporate relationship: "AOL Time Warner, which happens to be the parent of both the
Potter-presenting Warner Bros. movie studio and this very news network." Todd Leopold,
Looking

into

Harry

Potter's

crystal

ball,

CNN,

Nov.

14,

2002,

http://archives.cnn.com/2002/SHOWBIZMovies/11/14/whither.potter/.
Strangely, however, in
its reviews of Warner Brothers movies, CNN.com makes no such disclosure.
62. D. Casey Kobi, Wall Street v. Main Street.- The SEC's New Regulation FD and Its Impact
on Market Participants,77 IND. L.J. 551, 583 (2002).

63. U.S. SEcuRrrtEs AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 3 ("Firms must compete with
one another for investment banking business. Favorable analyst coverage of a company may
induce that company to hire the firm to underwrite a securities offering.").
64. Id.; Randall Smith, Will Investors Benefit from Wall Street Split?-Regulators Set Accord

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 37

This conflict of interest has become more common in recent years as
consolidation in the financial services industry has increasingly brought
research departments and investment banking departments under the
same roof in a financial conglomerate. 65 In addition, the pressures on
research analysts that result from this conflict have increased as firms'
investment banking businesses have become more important; falling
prices for brokerage services have caused investment bankinj6profits to

become a greater percentage of financial institutions' income.
Unfortunately, many research analysts succumbed to this conflict of
interest. These analysts gave positive forecasts and recommendations
regarding certain companies' stocks to secure investment banking
business from those companies. 6 7 As a result, readers of the research
analysts' reports were unknowingly obtaining biased forecasts and
recommendations, 68 causing millions of "[r]egular people... [to lose] a
collective fortune by relying on the tainted6 9advice of the biggest and
most trusted names in the world of finance."
On April 8, 2002, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer captured
headlines when his office secured a court order requiring Merrill Lynch
to provide increased disclosure of its research analysts' conflicts of

With Securities Firms,But Some Issues Persist,WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2002, at Cl.
A troubling pattern regulators found was that [investment] bankers and [research]
analysts would pitch for deals as "a team".... The pitch to issuers was, 'You're
getting us as investment bankers, and you're getting so-and-so as the analyst," and
corporate executives could 'meet and touch and feel' the analysts. It became collusive
and there's simply no hiding that the analysts were paid in part for bringing in the
business, and they weren't going to keep getting that business with negative ratings[.]"
Id. (quoting Mary Schapiro, NASD's Vice Chairman and President of Regulatory Policy and
Oversight).
65. Christine M. Bae & Carlton R. Asher, Jr., Chinese Walls-Proceduresand Remedies for
Dealing with Conflicts of Interest and Other Abuses by Broker-Dealers in Connection with
Conduct by Their Securities Analysts, PRACTICING L. INST., CORP. L. & PRAC. COURSE
HANDBOOK SERIES, 123, 146, PLI Order No. BO-01A6 (Aug. 2002).
66. Id. at 146-47.
67. See Patricia M. Dechow, Amy P. Hutton & Richard G. Sloan, The Relation Between
Analysts' Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following
Equity Offerings, 17 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1 (2000) (examining the role of sell-side analysts'
long-term earnings growth forecasts in the pricing of common equity offerings); Roni Michaely
& Kent L. Womack, Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriting Analyst
Recommendations, 12 REv. FIN. STUD. 653 (2000) (discussing the internal conflicts of interest at
investment banks).
68. SEC Final Rule: Regulation Analyst Certification, 17 C.F.R. § 242 (2003), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8193.htm (stating that the SEC is "particularly concerned that
many investors who rely on analysts' recommendations may not know, among other things, that
favorable research coverage could be used to market the investment banking services provided by
an analyst's firm[.]").
69. Spitzer Testimony, supra note 6, at 12.
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interest. 70 The court ordered Merrill Lynch, in its public research
reports or ratings of any company, to disclose any recent or prospective
that it had with the subject company of
investment banking7 relationship
1
the report or rating.
Attorney General Spitzer's ten-month investigation leading to the
order found that Merrill Lynch's research department had issued
positive public recommendations of certain companies' stocks to secure
investment banking business from those companies. 72 An affidavit
Spitzer's office filed with the court provided documents showing that
Merrill Lynch had publicly recommended that investors purchase a
number of internet stocks while, at the same time, famed internet
industry analyst Henry Blodget and other Merrill Lynch research
analysts were privately disparaging the investments. For example, in
internal e-mails, Merrill's research analysts were saying that some of
the recommended stocks were "piece[s] of junk," "piece[s] of shit," and
had underlying businesses that were "falling apart."
These revelations focused the public spotlight on how the desire for
investment banking revenue was causing bias in research analysts'
reports and ratings. However, many who were familiar with the
industry were already aware of the problem. Academic studies had
uncovered much evidence of bias. For example, finance professors
Roni Michaely and Kent Womak found that stocks recommended by the
research analysts perform worse than stocks
underwriters'
recommended by unaffiliated research analysts. 7 4 Also, Professors
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan found that research analysts employed by
the lead managers of equity offerings make more overly optimistic
long-term growth7 5 forecasts of the offering company than do other
research analysts.
In addition, Congress had recently held hearings to investigate the
role of research analysts in the creation-and subsequent bursting-of
70. Charles Gasparino, Merrill Lynch Analysts Told to Change Ways, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9,

2002, at C 1.
71. In addition, Merrill Lynch was ordered to disclose, in all its public research reports and
ratings, the percentage of stocks in the subject company's sector or industry that it placed in each
of the rating categories it used. Id.
72. Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Merrill Lynch
Stock Rating System Found Biased by Undisclosed Conflicts of Interest (Apr. 8, 2002),
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/apr08b_02.html.
73. Affidavit of Eric R. Dinallo in Support of Application for an Order Pursuant to General
available at
8,
2002),
(Apr.
11-13
at
354,
Law
Section
Business
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/apr/MerrillL.pdf [hereinafter Dinallo Affidavit].
74. Michaely & Womack, supra note 67, at 653.
75. Dechow et al., supra note 67.
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the Internet stock price bubble. 76 In July 2001, then acting SEC Chair
Laura Unger testified before a congressional subcommittee that "there is

a mood of skepticism about analysts' stock recommendations.

This

skepticism is due, in large part, 77to a blurring of the lines between
research and investment banking."
In response to such concerns, limited steps toward investigating and
addressing research analysts' conflicts of interest were being taken. The
SEC conducted on-site examinations of a number of financial
institutions that had both investment banking departments and research
departments. 7 8 These examinations focused on the conflicts of interest

that research analysts face because of their "financial interests in
companies thea
cover, reporting structures, and compensation
'7 arrangements.
Also, the Securities Industry Association-a trade organization
composed of more than 600 securities firms-produced a set of "Best

Practices for Research" guidelines. 80 These "best practices" included
separating research departments from investment banking departments
and disclosing analysts' personal financial interests in the companies
they cover. 8 1 Despite these "best practices" guidelines being voluntary
and unenforceable, 8 2 some members of the Securities Industry
Association officially adopted at least some of the guidelines. 83 In
addition, in July 2001, Merrill Lynch became the first major securities

firm to prohibit its84research analysts from owning stock of companies
the analysts cover.

76. Karen Contoudis, Analyst Conflicts of Interests: Are the NASD and NYSE Rules Enough?,
8 FORDHAM J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 123, 124 (2003) (discussing how the public's trust in so-called
"experts" led Congress to investigate financial analysts).
77. Written Testimony Concerning Conflicts of Interest Faced by Brokerage Firms and Their
Research Analysts: Hearingson the Quality of Wall Street Research Before the H. Subcomm. on
CapitalMarkets, Insurance and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, 106th Cong. (2001) (testimony of
Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/073101tslu.htm [hereinafter Unger Testimony].
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Information
about
the
Securities
Industry
Association
is
available
at
http://www.sia.com/about_sia (describing the organization and articulating its values).
81. Kelly S. Sullivan, Comment, Serving Two Masters: Securities Analyst Liability and
Regulation in the Face of Pervasive Conflicts of Interest, 70 UMKC L. REV. 415, 429-30 (2001).
82. Id. at 430-31 (explaining how the Securities Industry Association lacks enforcement
power over its members).
83. Jeff D. Opdyke, GuidelinesAim to Polish Analysts' Image, WALL ST. J., June 13, 2001, at
Cl.
84. Charles Gasparino & Jeff D. Opdyke, Merrill Lynch Alters a Policy on Analysts, WALL
ST. J., July 11, 2001, at C1.
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Following Spitzer's suit against Merrill Lynch, more dramatic actions
followed. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which in part gave
the SEC the mandate to promulgate rules, or to direct national securities
to create rules, to address research analysts'
exchanges and associations
85
conflicts of interest.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act specified that these rules should focus on a
number of areas. First, they should restrict the prepublication clearance
or approval of research reports by persons who are not directly
responsible for such research, and especially by persons engaged in
investment banking. 86 Second, they should prevent investment bankers
from supervising, or determining the compensation of, research
analysts. 87 Third, they should prevent actual or threatened retaliation by
investment bankers against research analysts who issue unfavorable
research reports about a company that is a current or prospective
investment banking client. 8 8 Fourth, they should define periods of time
around a company's public offering of securities during which research
analysts who work for brokers or dealers cannot issue research reports
relating to that issuer. 89 Fifth, the rules should "establish structural and
institutional safeguards within [the firms] to assure that [research]
analysts are separated by appropriate informational partitions within the
firm from the review, pressure or oversight of those whose involvement
in investment' 90banking activities might potentially bias their judgment or
supervision."
Sarbanes-Oxley also requires the adoption of rules requiring the
disclosure, when a research analyst issues a research report or makes a
public appearance, of the analyst's conflicts of interest. 9 1 These
disclosures must include the extent to which the analyst has investments
in the securities of the company that is the subject of the report or
appearance, 9 2 whether either the analyst or the analyst's employer has

85. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 501, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified at
15 U.S.C. § 78o-6) (West 2002). Congress passed Sarbanes-Oxley in the wake of Enron and
other corporate scandals. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2542
(2005).
86. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 501(a)(1)(A).
87. Id. § 501(a)(1)(B).
88. Id. § 501(a)(1)(C).
89. Id. § 501(a)(2).
90. Id. § 501(a)(3). The statute also allows the SEC or association or exchange to "address
such other issues as the Commission, or such association or exchange, determines appropriate."
Id. § 501(a)(4).
91. Id. § 501(b).
92. Id. at § 501(b)(l).
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received compensation from the company, 93 the extent to which the
company has been a client of the analyst's employer during the last
year, 94 and whether the analyst's compensation for the research report
was based at least
partly on the analyst's employer's investment
95
revenues.
banking
To satisfy these dictates of Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC approved a
number of changes to the rules of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD).
On May 10, 2002, the SEC approved amendments to NYSE Rules 472
(Communications with the Public) and 351 (Reporting Requirements)
and approved a new NASD Rule 2711 (Research Analysts and Research
Reports). 96 In December 2002 and May 2003, the NYSE and NASD
filed proposed amendments to their research analyst conflict of interest
rules with the SEC.9 7 In July 2003, the SEC approved these additional
changes as well. 98 In the same month, the NYSE and NASD filed
additional proposed amendments to their rules, which the SEC also
approved.99
These rules and regulations can be grouped into three broad
categories: (1) those designed to make research analysts independent,
especially from their firms' investment bankers; (2) those designed to
prevent research analysts from having a personal financial stake in the
effect of their coverage on the companies they cover; and (3) those
requiring public disclosure of research analysts' conflicts of interests.
Several of these rules are aimed at ensuring that research analysts
work independently, especially from their firm's investment bankers.
For example, NASD Rule 2711 and NYSE Rule 472 mandate that
research analysts cannot be "subject to the supervision or control" of an
employee of the investment banking department. 10 0 Also, no one
involved with investment banking activities may "directly or indirectly,
retaliate against or threaten to retaliate against" a research analyst who
makes an unfavorable research report or public appearance that might
93. Id. § 501(b)(2).
94. Id. § 501(b)(3).
95. Id. § 501(b)(4). The statute also requires that the SEC or the association or exchange
mandate disclosure of any other "material" conflicts of interest that it deems appropriate. Id. §
501 (b)(5).
96. NASD and NYSE Rule Making, Exchange Act Release No. 34-45908, 77 SEC Docket
1737 (May 10, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-45908.htm.
97.

Samuel Winer, Amy N. Kroll & Adam J. Eisner, Recent SRO Rules Regarding Research

Analyst Conflicts of Interest 203, 205 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Cont. Leg. Edu.) (Jan. 8-9, 2004).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. NASD MANUAL § 271 1(b)(1) (2005); NYSE RULE 472(b)(1) (2002).
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adversely affect the firm's current or potential investment banking
relationship with the subject company. 10 1 In addition, except to verify
the accuracy of facts in the report or to identify a potential conflict of
interest, nonresearch personnel may not review a research report before
to participate in
its publication. 10 2 Also, research analysts are forbidden
10 3
business.
banking
investment
of
solicitation
the
To assure their independence, research analysts' communications
with the companies they cover are also restricted. Except to verify a
report's factual accuracy, the subject company of a research report may
not be sent a copy of the report before its publication. 10 4 In addition,
the subject company cannot be given significant advance notice of a
intent to change the analyst's rating of the
research analyst's
05
company. 1
Other rules prohibit firms from promising favorable coverage of a
company in exchange for compensation or that company's investment
banking business. Research analysts are generally forbidden from
publishing or distributing research reports, and from making public
appearances, regarding a company soon after the analyst's firm was10 a6
manager or co-manager of a securities offering by that company.
There is a similar prohibition for a period after an initial public offering
in which the analyst's company participates, or agrees to participate, as
an underwriter or dealer. 7 In addition, if coverage of a company is
and generally
terminated, the firm must give notice of this termination
1 8
must produce a final research report on the company. 0
Other rules are focused on preventing research analysts from having
direct financial incentives to help their investment banking departments.
Research analysts cannot receive any compensation based upon a
specific investment banking services transaction. 1°9 In addition, a
firm's committee that approves analysts' compensation cannot have a
Also, the
representative of the investment banking department. 11

101. NASD MANUAL § 2711(j); NYSE RULE 472(g)(2).
102. NASD MANUAL § 2711(b)(2)-(3); NYSE RULE 472(b)(2)-(3).
103. NASD MANUAL § 2711(c)(4); NYSE RULE 472(b)(5).
104. NASD MANUAL § 2711 (c)(1)-(2)); NYSE RULE 472(c)(4).
105. NASD MANUAL § 2711 (c)(3); NYSE RULE 472(c)(4)(iii).
106. NASD MANUAL § 2711(f)(1); NYSE RULE 472(f)(1)-(2). An exception is made for
reports and public appearances concerning significant events that happen to the company. NASD
MANUAL § 271 l(f)(1)(B)(i); NYSE RULE 472(f)(5).
107. NASD MANUAL § 2711(f)(2); NYSE RULE 472(f)(3).
108. NASD MANUAL § 2711(0)(5); NYSE RULE 472(0(6).
109. NASD MANUAL § 271 l(d)(1); NYSE RULE 472(h)(1).
110. NASD MANUAL § 271 l(d)(2); NYSE RULE 472(h)(2).
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analyst's contribution to the firm's investment banking business, and
the views of the firm's investment banking department1 1regarding the
analyst, cannot be a factor in the analyst's compensation.
To prevent analysts from having a personal financial interest in how
their reports affect the securities prices of the companies they cover,
restrictions are also put on research analysts' personal trading of
securities. For example, an analyst is prohibited in general from buying
or selling any security of a company around the time that the analyst's
firm publishes a research report on the company or changes the rating or
price target of the company's securities.1 12 In addition, a research
analyst may not acquire a company's securities before its initial public
offering if the issuer is "principally engaged in the same types of
business" as companies that the research analyst follows.1 13 Also, in
general, a research analyst may not transact in any security in a manner
inconsistent with the analyst's most recently published report regarding
the issuer. 1 14 For example, in general, an analyst may not sell a stock if
the analyst's most recent report recommends that investors purchase the
stock. Furthermore, legal or compliance personnel of the research
analyst's employer must preapprove any transactions by persons who
oversee research analysts if the transactions are of equity securities of a
company covered by those analysts. 115
The last type of new rule requires disclosure of a research analyst's
conflicts of interest. These disclosures must be "clear, comprehensive,
and prominent."' 116 Some of the rules require the disclosure of the
analyst's personal financial interest in the subject company or in the
analyst's firm's investment banking revenues. They require research
reports 117 to disclose the existence and nature of any financial interest
the analyst or a member of the analyst's household has in the securities
of the subject company; 1 18 whether the analyst or a member of the

Ill. NASD MANUAL § 2711 (d)(2); NYSE RULE 472(h)(2).
112. Such purchases are prohibited from thirty days before the report or change in rating or
price target is issued until five days after its issuance. An exception exists for transactions in the
thirty days preceding the issuance of a report or rating or price change made in response to
significant news regarding the company. NASD MANUAL § 2711 (g)(2); NYSE RULE 472(e)(2).
113. NASD MANUAL § 271 l(g)(1); NYSE RULE 472(e)(1).
114. NASD MANUAL § 271 1(g)(3); NYSE RULE 472(e)(3).
115. NASD MANUAL § 271 l(g)(6); NYSE RULE 472(e)(5).
116. NASD MANUAL § 2711(h)(10); NYSE RULE 472(k)(1). In addition, the disclosures
either must be on the front page of the research report, or the front page of the report must refer to
the page where the disclosures are located. Id.
117. The disclosure requirements for public appearances by research analysts are similar to
the disclosure requirements for research reports.
118. NASD MANUAL § 271 l(h)(1)(A); NYSE Rule 472(k)(1)(iii)(b).
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analyst's household is a director, officer, or advisory board member of
the subject company; 119 and any other "actual, material conflict of
interest" of the analyst or the analyst's firm. 120 In addition, research
reports must disclose if the analyst has received compensation based on
the analyst's firm's investment banking revenues or from the subject
company of the report. 121
The analyst's firm's business with the subject company must also be
disclosed. Generally, disclosure is required when the analyst's firm has
recently managed or co-managed a public offering of the subject
company or if the firm or an affiliate of the firm has recently received or
expects to soon receive or seek compensation from the subject company
for investment banking and/or other services and products. 12 2 It must
firm is making a market in the subject
also be disclosed if12the
3
company's securities.
Finally, information related to the rating system the analyst uses to
rate securities must also be disclosed in the research reports. Each
rating used in the rating system---such as "Strong Buy," "Neutral," and
"Sell"--must be defined.124 These definitions must be "consistent with
[the ratings'] plain meaning." 125 Second, the report must provide
information about the distribution of ratings given by all the employer's
analysts. Specifically, it must state both the percentage of covered
companies, and the percentage of covered companies for which the
employer has recently provided investment banking services, that would
receive "Buy," "Hold/Neutral," or "Sell" ratings (even if the analyst
uses a different rating system). 12 6 The report also must contain a graph
that displays the security's past127daily closing prices and the analyst's
rating and price target changes.
In addition to approving these changes in the rules of the NYSE and
NASD, the SEC adopted Regulation Analyst Certification (Regulation
AC), which also requires certain disclosures. 12 8 Regulation AC requires
119. NASD MANUAL § 271 l(h)(3); NYSE RULE 472(k)(1)(iii)(c).
120. NASD MANUAL § 271 1(h)(1)(C); NYSE RULE 472(k)(1)(iii)(d).
121. NASD MANUAL § 271 l(h)(2)(A)(i); NYSE RULE 472(k)(1)(ii)(a).
122. NASD MANUAL § 2711(h)(2)(A)(ii); NYSE RULE 472(k)(1)(i)(a).
123. NASD MANUAL § 271 1(h)(8); NYSE RULE 472(k)(l)(i)(b).
124. NASD MANUAL § 271 1(h)(4); NYSE RULE 472(k)(1)(i)(f).
125. NASD MANUAL § 2711(h)(4); NYSE RULE 472(k)(1)(i)(f).
126. NASD MANUAL § 2711(h)(5)(A)-(B); NYSE RULE 472(k)(l)(i)(g).
127. NASD MANUAL § 2711(h)(6); NYSE RULE 472(k)(1)(i)(h). This requirement only
exists for securities that have been rated for at least one year. Id. The graph must contain data for
the lesser of three years or the period for which the company has been rated. Id.
128. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Amends Definition of
2003),
6,
(Feb.
Rule
Certification
Analyst
Adopts
Banks,
for
"Dealer"
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that research reports disclose whether the analyst received any payments
in connection with the specific recommendations or views expressed in
the report. 129 The research analyst must also certify that the views
30
expressed in the report accurately reflect the analyst's own views. 1
In addition to these rule and regulation changes, a number of lawsuits
were filed in response to research analysts' bias. First, private suits
have sought damages on behalf of investors who allegedly lost money
by relying on biased research reports. 13 1 Also, on April 28, 2003, the
SEC, the NYSE, the NASD, the North American Securities
Administrators Association, the New York Attorney General, and state
securities regulators settled joint enforcement actions against ten large
securities firms and two individuals. 132 These actions alleged that all
the firms had "supervisory deficiencies" and "engaged in acts and
practices that created or maintained inappropriate influence by
investment banking over research analysts, thereby imposing conflicts
of interest on research analysts ' that
the firms failed to manage in an
13 3
manner."
appropriate
or
adequate
As part of the global settlement, the firms paid a total of
approximately $1.4 billion in fines, disgorgement, and the funding of
independent research and investor education. 134 Other terms of the
settlement agreement required structural changes in the firms to increase
their research analysts' independence from their investment bankers.
These changes are consistent with the recently adopted SEC, NYSE,
and NASD rules and regulations discussed above. Among the most
important changes is the creation of firewalls and physical separation
between research and investment banking departments of the firms,
including prohibiting research analysts from participating in the

http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-2 1.html.
129. 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(2) (2003).
130. 17 C.F.R. § 242.501(a)(1). Recall that some Merrill Lynch analysts had issued reports
recommending certain investments at the same time that those analysts were privately disparaging
those same investments. Supra note 73 and accompanying text. Similar disclosure requirements
exist for views expressed in public appearances by an analyst. 17 C.F.R. § 242.502.
131.

Margo McCall, NY Probe Spurs New Brand of Lawsuit, WIRELESS WEEK, July 22, 2002,

available at http://www.wirelessweek.com/article/CA234275.html.
132. Joint Press Release, SEC, New York Attorney General, North American Securities
Administrators Association, NASD, NYSE, and state securities regulators, Ten of Nation's Top
Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research
and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm
[hereinafter Joint Press Release].
133. Id. Other charges specific to particular firms were also made. Id.
134. This was composed of $487.5 million in penalties, $387.5 million in disgorgement,
$432.5 million to fund independent research, and $80 million to fund investor education. Id.
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Also, the firms'
solicitation of investment banking business. 135
investment bankers are prevented from having input into the
In addition, the
determination of the research departments' budgets.
investment bankers are prohibited from evaluating research analysts'
performance and from having even indirect input into research analysts'
be even
compensation. 137 Also, research analysts' compensation cannot
13 8
indirectly based on the firms' investment banking revenues.
The global settlement also imposed a disclosure requirement. The
ten firms must make available publicly historical information on the
1 39
ratings and stock price target forecasts their research analysts gave.
This disclosure is intended to 14"enable investors to evaluate and compare
the performance of analysts." 0
In summary, the combination of the reforms imposed by the SEC,
NASD, NYSE, and the global settlement are causing significant
changes in the industry. However, the rationale for these reforms are
based upon assumptions regarding what causes bias in research reports
and harm to investors: (1) research analysts lacking independence, (2)
research analysts having personal financial stakes in how their reports
affect the prices of the securities of the subjects of their reports, and (3)
insufficient disclosure of analysts' conflicts of interest. This Article
empirically analyzes the experience of movie critics, who face a
situation similar to those facing research analysts, for evidence of
whether these assumptions are correct, and thus whether these reforms
are likely to actually reduce analysts' bias.

IV.

TESTING FOR BIAS IN MOVIE REVIEWS

This Article empirically studies whether there is bias in the movie
reviews of media outlets affiliated with movie studios. To do this, the
Article examines three media conglomerates that own movie studios
and own media outlets that review movies: The Walt Disney Company,
Time Warner Inc., and The News Co oration Limited. First, this Part
describes the data used in this study. 14 The second section of this Part
describes the empirical methodology used to test for bias and presents
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. SEC FACT SHEET ON GLOBAL ANALYST RESEARCH SETTLEMENTS, NASD, NYSE, AND
at
28,
2003),
available
REGULATORS
(Apr.
STATE
SECURITIES
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/factsheet.htm.
140. Joint Press Release, supra note 132.
141. See infra Part IV.A (outlining the media outlets, movie critics, and movie studios).
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42
the results of this analysis.1

A. Data
The media outlets, movie critics, and the primary movie studios
involved in this study are summarized in Table 1.
TABLE 1:
MOVIE STUDIO OWNERSHIP

Movie Companies Owned
Critics' Media Outlet

Primary Critics

Parent Company

by Parent

Ebert & Roeper

Roger Ebert

Walt Disney Co.

Walt Disney Pictures
Touchstone Pictures

Richard Roeper

Miramax Films
Dimension Films

Entertainment Weekly

Owen Gleiberman

Time Warner Inc.

Warner Bros. Pictues
New Line Cinema

Lisa Schwarzbaum

Fine Line Features

New York Post

Jonathan Foreman
Lou Lumenick

News Corp. Ltd.

20th Century Fox
Fox Searchlight Pictures

As noted earlier, the Walt Disney Company is the world's second
largest media and entertainment conglomerate.14 3 It includes several
film production and distribution companies, as well as Buena Vista
Television, home of the weekly Ebert & Roeper program. 144 Ebert &
is the "topRoeper appears on more than 200 television stations and
14 5
rated first-run weekly syndicated half-hour on television."
Time Warner Inc., the world's largest media and entertainment
142.
143.
144.
145.

See infra Part IV.B (describing the empirical methodology and explaining the results).
Supra note 20 and accompanying text.
Who Owns What: The Walt Disney Company, supra note 10.
Ebert & Roeper, supra note 30.
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company, also owns several film companies and news outlets, including
Entertainment Weekly magazine, CNN, Time magazine, and People
magazine. 14 6 However, limits on the availability of data restrict this
Article to analyzing EntertainmentWeekly's movie reviews.
Entertainment Weekly is a weekly national magazine focusing on the
entertainment industry and has a paid circulation of approximately 1.8
million. 147 In addition to reporting movie reviews made by certain
outside reviewers, it also carries the reviews of its own staff of
reviewers. During the time period encompassed by this study, five
critics reviewed movies for Entertainment Weekly itself, however, two
of them-Owen Gleiberman and Lisa Schwarzbaun--accounted for
more than ninety percent of the reviews.
Finally, the News Corporation Limited owns 20th Century Fox and
Fox Searchlight Pictures, as well as numerous print and broadcast news
outlets, including the New York Post.148 The New York Post, a daily
newspaper with a circulation of approximately 673,000,149 regularly
prints movie reviews by its critics. During the time period encompassed
by this study, five critics reviewed movies for the New York Post,
however,
two
of
them---Jonathan
Foreman
and
Lou
Lumenick-accounted for more than ninety-five percent of the
150
reviews.
To test whether bias exists in media conglomerates' movie reviews,
this Article empirically examines whether Ebert & Roeper's reviews are
biased in favor of Disney movies, whether Entertainment Weekly's
reviews are biased in favor of Time Warner movies, and whether the
New York Post's reviews are biased in favor of News Corporation
movies.
This Article uses the 1,082 movies that appeared in the "Crix Picks"
section of Variety magazine and opened in the United States from
January 1, 2000, through March 31, 2003.
Variety magazine is
sometimes referred to as the "bible" of the show business industry and

146. Who Owns What: Time Warner, supra note 10.
147. Michael Learmonth, Sagging TV Guide Gets Glossy Makeover, DAILY VARIETY, July
27, 2005, at 1.
148. Who Owns What: News Corporation,supra note 10.
149. Julie Bosman, Daily News Editor Resigns After Less Than a Year, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2005, at C13.
150. The News Corporation Limited also owns many local television stations in the United
States, some of which broadcast movie reviews occasionally as part of their news broadcasts.
Who Owns What: News Corporation, supra note 10. However, access to these reviews is
unavailable so they are not included in this study.
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is not affiliated with any movie studio. 15 1 Each week, Variety's Crix
Picks section tabulates movie reviews from many of the best-known
movie critics in the United States 152 for approximately six movies
opening that week. 153 These movies include at least the two largest
"blockbusters" and at least one smaller "niche" movie released that
week. 154 Although there are over 100 critics in the pool from which
Variety collects reviews, 15 5 the number of reviews compiled for any
particular movie is much less. For the movies used in this Article,
Variety collected between one and fifty-one reviews, with an average of
seventeen. The number of reviews varies because the number of critics
who review a movie differ; significant films from major studios are
156
generally reviewed by more critics than are smaller "niche" films.
Crix Picks includes all reviews that its pool of critics sends to Variety,
and occasionally Variety will solicit reviews
from critics who have not
15 7
sent their reviews to Variety in some time.
Each review collected by Crix Picks is labeled as giving the movie a
favorable review (Pro), an unfavorable review (Con), or a mixed review
(Mixed). The vast majority of the reviewers designate for Crix Picks
which category their review is in.158 For the few critics who do not
choose a categor, Variety's editorial staff reads the reviews and makes
the designation. 159
B. EmpiricalMethodology and Results
Bias in favor of an affiliated studio's movies can take two forms.
First, bias might exist in the selection of which movies a critic reviews.
Second, bias could exist in the grades a reviewer gives to affiliated
studios' movies. This Article tests for both forms of bias.

151.

See, e.g., Anthony DeBarros & Susan Wloszczyna, Movie Critics, Fans Follow

Surprisingly Similar Script, USA TODAY, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al (describing the results of a 2003
study of movies' critical reviews compared to their gross revenues).
152. It also compiles reviews from many British critics, however those reviews are not used in
this study.
153. On rare occasions, Crix Picks is not published in a particular week, however, typically
the next Crix Picks' is expanded to also cover movies released during that skipped week.
Telephone Interview with Jill Feiwell, Assistant Editor, Variety (July 16, 2003).
154. Id. Niche movies are specialized films, which traditionally have been targeted at
narrower audiences and have been less expensive to make. Dana Harris, Hollywood Renews
Niche Pitch, VARIETY, Apr. 7, 2003, at 1, 54.
155. Interview with Jill Feiwell, supra note 153.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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1. Bias in the Selection of Movies to Review
Bias in the selection of which movies are reviewed may also take one
of two forms. A media outlet may be more likely to review an affiliated
studio's films to increase publicity for those films. On the other hand,
the media outlet might be more likely to review good films from that
studio, but less likely to review bad films from that studio to avoid
adding to negative publicity regarding the bad movies. This would
allow a critic who wants to give sincere reviews to still be more likely
to give positive reviews, and less likely to give negative reviews, to
affiliated films than do other critics.
Table 2 presents the number and percentage of movies listed in
Variety's Crix Pix-broken down by the parent company of the
distributing studio--that were reviewed by each media outlet.
TABLE

2:

PERCENTAGE OF MOVIES REVIEWED

Parent Company of Distributing Studios

Ebert & Roeper

Disney

Time Warner

News Corp.

Parent

(118 movies)

(123 movies)

(56 movies)

Disney

78.8%

84.6%

87.5%

Time Warner

96.6%

95.9%

96.4%

News Corp.

99.2%

100.0%

100.0%

(612 movies reviewed)

Entertainment Weekly
(776 movies reviewed)

New York Post
(1014 movies reviewed)

Chi-squared = 4.06, Degrees of freedom=10 (Not Statistically Significant)

This Table shows that critics are no more likely to review movies
distributed by an affiliated studio than movies distributed by an
unaffiliated studio. In fact, Disney-owned Ebert & Roeper reviewed a
smaller percentage of the Disney-distributed movies (78.8%) than of the
Time Warner (84.6%) or the News Corporation movies (87.5%).
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Similarly, Entertainment Weekly, which is owned by Time Warner was

no more likely to review the Time Warner movies (95.9%) than the
Disney movies (96.6%) or the News Corporation movies (96.4%) and
the New York Post was no more likely to review the News Corporation

movies (100%) than Time Warner (100%) or Disney movies (99.2%).
Indeed, there is no statistically significant difference between the
percentage of affiliated movies and the percentage
of unaffiliated
160
outlets.
media
these
by
reviewed
are
that
movies
As noted above, bias in the selection of movies to review may instead

take the form of choosing to review higher quality movies from
affiliated studios than from unaffiliated studios. To test for this form of
bias, Table 3 displays the average quality of the movies reviewed by
each media outlet, broken down by the parent of the distributing studio.
The quality of a particular movie is measured as the average grade, as
calculated from Variety's Crix Pics that the movie received from critics
with no affiliation to the studio that distributed the movie. Thus, a

movie's quality is calculated as the number of favorable reviews minus
the number of unfavorable reviews, divided by the total number of
reviews. For example, if a movie had eight favorable reviews, three
unfavorable reviews, and nine mixed reviews, the movie's quality
would be 0.25.161 Quality ranges from -1 for a movie with only
unfavorable reviews to +1 for a movie with only favorable reviews; the

quality of a movie with an equal number of favorable and unfavorable
reviews would be 0.

160. Statistical significance is determined by first positing a null hypothesis. Here, the null
hypothesis is that the percentage of movies reviewed is independent of the parent company of the
movies' distributor. To test the validity of the null hypothesis, a test statistic is then calculated
from the data by assuming that the null hypothesis is true. In this case, the test statistic is a chisquare statistic with 10 degrees of freedom. If the value of the test statistic is sufficiently
extreme, then the null hypothesis can be rejected, or in other words, there would be a statistically
significant relationship between the between the percentage of movies reviewed and the parent
company of the movies' distributor. However, as noted in Table 2, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected because the chi-squared statistic is only 4.06.
161. (8 favorable reviews - 3 unfavorable reviews) / (8 favorable reviews + 3 unfavorable
reviews + 9 mixed reviews) = 0.25. Note that this methodology is identical to calculating the
value of the average review, where a favorable review has a value of +1, an unfavorable review
has a value of - 1, and each mixed review has a value of 0.
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TABLE

3:

AVERAGE QUALITY OF MOVIES REVIEWED

Parent Company of Distributing Studios

Ebert & Roeper

Entertainment Weekly

New York Post

Parent

Disney

Time Warner

News Corp.

Disney

.1710

-.0588

.0916

(93 movies)

(104 movies)

(49 movies)

.1407

-.0719

.0224

(114 movies)

(118 movies)

(54 movies)

.1283

-.0792

.0132

(117 movies)

(123 movies)

(56 movies)

Time Warner

News Corp.

As shown in Table 3, critics do not review better affiliated movies
than unaffiliated movies. Although the average Disney movie reviewed
by Ebert & Roeper is higher quality (.1710) than the average Time
Warner (-.0588) or News Corporation movie (.0916) it reviews, that
appears to be because the average Disney movie made was of higher
quality, not because of a bias by Ebert & Roeper in favor of Disney
movies. Indeed, the average Disney movie reviewed by Entertainment
Weekly and the New York Post were also higher quality than the average
Time Warner or News Corporation movie that those publications
reviewed.
Ebert & Roeper reviewed fewer movies (612 movies) than
Entertainment Weekly (776 movies), which reviewed fewer movies than
the New York Post (1014 movies). It appears that the outlets that
reviewed fewer movies often chose not to review lower quality movies,
regardless of who the distributor was. For each distributor, the average
quality of movie reviewed by Ebert & Roeper was higher than the
average quality of movie reviewed by Entertainment Weekly, which was
higher than the average quality of movie reviewed by .the New York
Post. Thus, although Ebert & Roeper and Entertainment Weekly were
more likely to review higher quality movies than lower quality movies,
this decision was independent of which studio distributed the movie.
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For example, the difference between the average quality of Disney and
News Corporation movies reviewed was not more for Ebert & Roeper
(.0794) 16' than it was for the New York Post (.1151). 11 3 If there is bias
in the selection of movies to review, Ebert & Roeper should exhibit a
bigger gap in the quality of Disney and News Corporation movies it
reviews than does the New York Post. Indeed, an examination of Table
3 demonstrates that, relative to the other media outlets, none of the
media outlets discriminated in favor of higher quality affiliated movies.
Thus, Tables 2 and 3 provide support for the conclusion that there is
no bias in the selection of which movies are reviewed. However,
additional analysis is necessary to control for other factors that may be
preventing the detection of bias. Thus, a multiple regression analysis is
used in which number of quantifiable, explanatory variables are
examined that may affect the probability that a particular movie is
reviewed. 164 The definitions of these variables are summarized in Table
4.

162. As displayed in Table 3, for Ebert & Roeper, the average quality of Disney movies
reviewed was .1710, and the average quality of News Corporation movies was .0916. Thus, there
was a .0794 difference in the average quality of Disney and News Corporation movies reviewed.
163. As displayed in Table 3, for the New York Post, the average quality of Disney movies
reviewed was .1283, and the average quality of News Corporation movies was .0132. Thus there
was a.1151 difference in the average quality of Disney and News Corporation movies reviewed.
164. Multiple regressions are used to determine the relationship between a particular variable
(the "dependent variable") and more than one "explanatory" or "independent" variables.
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TABLE 4:
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES

VARIABLE

DEFINITION

Independent Variables

#_REVIEWS

Number of reviews of movie by unaffiliated critics

NICHE

Movie is distributed by a "niche" studio (l=yes, 0-no)

AFFILIATE

Movie is affiliated with the critic (l=yes, 0=-no)

QUALITY

Average grade given to movie by unaffiliated critics

Interaction term of AFFILIATE and QUALITY variables (AFFILIATE
AFFILIATE*QUALITY
multiplied by QUALITY)

Dependent Variables

REVIEW

Movie is reviewed by the particular media outlet (l=yes, O=no)

GRADE

Grade given to movie by the critic

a. Independent Variables Explained
This Section briefly explains the variables listed in the foregoing
table.
i. Number of UnaffiliatedReviews
The first explanatory variable, #_REVIEWS, is the number of
reviews reported in Variety's Crix Picks by reviewers with no affiliation
to the studio that distributed the movie. Specifically, it excludes
reviews in Disney media outlets of films distributed by Disney studios,
reviews in Time Warner media outlets of films distributed by Time
Warner studios, and reviews in News Corporation media outlets of films
distributed by News Corporation studios.
Many of the same factors that lead unaffiliated critics to review a
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movie-pre-release publicity, etc.--should also cause affiliated critics
to review it. Thus, all else equal, the more unaffiliated reviewers who
reviewed a certain movie, the more likely that a particular affiliated
reviewer should have reviewed it also.
ii. Niche Studio Movie
NICHE is a dummy variable that denotes whether the film is
distributed by a niche movie studio. 165 NICHE has a value of 1 if the
film was distributed by a niche studio and a value of 0 if it was
distributed instead by a major studio. 16 6 Films from major studios tend
to be higher profile, have more pre-release publicity, and have wider
intended audiences. Thus, mass-market media outlets, such as Ebert &
Roeper, Entertainment Weekly, and the New York Post, may be less
likely to review movies from niche studios than are media outlets with a
narrower target audience.
iii. Affiliated Movie
AFFILIATE is a dummy variable that denotes whether the movie is
distributed by a studio affiliated with the media outlet in which the
review appears. AFFILIATE has a value of 1 if a movie is an affiliated
movie and a value of 0 otherwise. For example, for Entertainment
Weekly, AFFILIATE has a value of 1 if the movie is distributed by a
studio owned by Time Warner and a value of 0 otherwise. If media
outlets are more likely to review films of affiliated studios then, all else
equal, AFFILIATE should be _positively correlated with whether a
16
movie is reviewed (REVIEW).
iv. Quality of Movie
As noted above, bias in choosing which movies to review may take
another form instead. Reviewers may be more likely to review good
affiliated movies and less likely to review lower quality affiliated

165. A dummy variable is an artificially constructed variable that has a value of 1 when the
particular characteristic of interest is present and a value of 0 if the characteristic is absent.
166. The major studios are those owned by The Walt Disney Company, DreamWorks LLC,
Fox Entertainment Group Inc., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Paramount PLC, Sony Corporation,
NBC Universal Inc., and Time Warner Inc., with the exception of their niche film studios. The
niche studios of these companies are Miramax Zoe (Disney), Fox Searchlight (News Corp.),
United Artists (MGM), Paramount Classics (Paramount), Screen Gems (Sony), Sony Pictures
Classics (Sony), Universal Focus (Universal), Cinemax (Time Warner), Fine Line Features (Time
Warner), and HBO (Time Warner). Dana Harris, Hollywood Renews Niche Pitch, VARIETY, Apr.
7, 2003, at 1.
167. Two variables are positively correlated if, when the value of one variable increases,
generally the value of the other variable increases as well.
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movies. This would allow a critic who wants to give sincere reviews to
still be more likely to give positive reviews, and less likely to give
negative reviews, to affiliated films. To test for this alternative type of
bias, two other explanatory variables are also used: QUALITY and
AFFILIATE x QUALITY.
As discussed above, QUALITY is the average grade given to the
movie by unaffiliated reviewers, as calculated from Variety's Crix
Picks. It is calculated as the number of favorable reviews minus the
number of unfavorable reviews, divided by the total number of reviews.
v. Affiliation and Quality Interaction Term
An interaction term (AFFILIATE x QUALITY) equal to AFFILIATE
multiplied by QUALITY is also included. 16 8 It is used to test whether
media outlets are more likely to review a good affiliated movie than a
good unaffiliated movie, and whether they are less likely to review a
bad affiliated movie than a bad unaffiliated movie. This interaction
variable will be greater than zero for an affiliated movie that has
generally received positive reviews, less than zero for an affiliated
movie that has generally received negative reviews, and zero for an
unaffiliated movie. If reviewers are more likely to write reviews for
good affiliated movies than for good unaffiliated movies, but less likely
to write reviews for bad affiliated movies than for bad unaffiliated
movies, then, all else equal, this interaction term should be positively
correlated with whether a movie is reviewed.
b. Review Bias Explored
To test which of these independent variables help explain which
movies are reviewed, the dependent variable REVIEW-whether a
particular movie is reviewed-is regressed against these independent
variables and an intercept term. This regression is conducted for each
of the media outlets: Ebert & Roeper, Entertainment Weekly, and the
New York Post. Because the dependent variable (REVIEW) has only
two possible values (i.e., a movie is either reviewed or not reviewed),
logistic regressions are used. 169 The results from these regressions are
168. Interaction terms in multiple regressions are used to account for more complex
relationships between variables. For example, this Article is interested in determining whether
reviewers are more likely to review affiliated movies than unaffiliated movies. However, the
answer to this question may depend upon an additional variable-the quality of the movie. In
other words, reviewers may be more likely to review high quality affiliated movies than high
quality unaffiliated movies, but less likely to review low quality affiliated movies than low
quality unaffiliated movies. An interaction term can be used to test whether this more
complicated relationship between the variables exists.
169. A logistic regression is an appropriate type of multiple regression when, as here, the
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displayed in Table 5.
TABLE 5:
DETERMINANTS OF DECISION TO REVIEW
LOGIT ESTIMATES
(P-VALUES IN PARENTHESES)

AFFILIATE

AFFILIATE

QUALITY

x
QUALITY

Pseudo
2
R

-2.2573 ***

-0.5477 *

0.6588 ***

0.0556

.3498

(<.0001)

(.0739)

(.0001)

(.9121)

0.1707 ***

-3.3278 ***

0.7261

0.5145 ***

1.0298

(<.0001)

(<.0001)

(.2390)

(.0033)

(.2682)

0.4813

0.3856 ***

-0.7186

Positive

0.0657

N/A

(.3797)

(<.0001)

(.1700)

(>.2500)

(.7685)

N/A

Intercept

#REVIEW

NICHE

Roeper

-0.1369

0.1241 ***

(612 movies)

(.5475)

(<.0001)

Ent. Weekly

1.405 ***

(776 movies)

(.0006)

N.Y. Post
(1014 movies)

Ebert &

.4361

.3624

• Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
•* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level
***

Statistically significant at the 1 percent level

As expected, the estimated coefficients of the #_REVIEWS variable
are positive and statistically significant for all three media outlets. As
noted, many of the same factors that lead unaffiliated critics to review a
movie, such as pre-release publicity, should also cause affiliated critics
to review it. The results confirm that, all else equal, the more
unaffiliated reviewers who review a certain movie, the more likely that
a particular affiliated reviewer will review it also.
Also, all three media outlets were less likely to review movies
distributed by niche studios, which are represented by the NICHE
variable. For Ebert & Roeper and Entertainment Weekly, this result was
dependent variable can have only two possible values. See G. S. MADDALA, LIMITEDDEPENDENT AND QUALITATIVE VARIABLES IN ECONOMETRICS 22-27 (1 st ed. 1983) (describing
logistic regressions).
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statistically significant. As noted above, this result was not unexpected,
because all three media outlets have wide intended audiences and thus
may be less likely to review niche films than are other media outlets.
The estimated coefficients of the other explanatory variables indicate
that there is not bias in the selection of movies to review, confirming the
conclusions from Tables 2 and 3. As the estimated coefficients of the
AFFILIATE variable show, all else equal, none of the media outlets are

significantly more likely to review affiliated movies than unaffiliated
movies. 17 In fact, all else equal, Ebert & Roeper is actually
less likely
17 1
sources.
other
from
movies
than
movies
Disney
to review
In addition, the estimated coefficients of the QUALITY variable
demonstrate that, all else equal, all the media outlets are more likely to
review higher quality movies than lesser quality movies. 172 For Ebert
& Roeper and Entertainment Weekly this result is statistically
significant. However, as the estimated coefficients of the AFFILIATE
x QUALITY interaction variable show, none of the media outlets are
significantly more likely
to review higher quality affiliated movies than
17 3
unaffiliated movies.
The results for the New York Post require some additional

170. None of the estimated coefficients of the AFFILIATE variable are positive and
statistically significant. Also, note that because of the presence of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY
interaction term in the regressions, the proper interpretation of the coefficient of AFFILIATE is
the effect of affiliation on the dependent variable when QUALITY=O (i.e., when a movie receives
the same number of positive and negative reviews from unaffiliated reviewers).
171. The combination of the findings that niche studios' movies are less likely to be reviewed
and affiliated movies are not more likely to be reviewed could be consistent with another type of
bias: a "scratching each other's back" bias. For example, Entertainment Weekly (a Time Warner
publication) might be more likely to review other major studios' films believing that, in
exchange, media outlets affiliated with those other studios will be more likely to review Time
Warner's films. However, it is unlikely that this type of bias is occurring. All else equal, the
examined critics are not more likely to review the films of major studios that are part of
conglomerates with movie critics than they are to review the films of major studios that lack
affiliated critics. The empirical analyses that show this are available from the author.
172. All of the estimated coefficients of the QUALITY variable are positive. Because of the
presence of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY interaction term in the regressions, the proper
interpretation of the coefficient of QUALITY is the effect of movie quality on the dependent
variable when AFFILIATE=0 (i.e., when the movie is reviewed by an unaffiliated reviewer).
173. None of the estimated coefficients of the AFFILIATE x QUALITY variable are positive
and statistically significant. Note also that a film's genre (comedy, action, etc.) might affect the
probability that a movie is reviewed. For example, if Entertainment Weekly's readers enjoy
action movies more than do readers of other publications, then Entertainment Weekly's critics
might be more likely to review an action movie than are other reviewers. To control for this
factor, the regressions were rerun including, as explanatory variables, dummy variables for the
movies' genres, as listed in the Internet Movie Database, http://www.imdb.com (last visited Feb.
6, 2006). However, controlling for genre did not markedly change any of the results. The full
logistic results when genre variables are included are available from the author.
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explanation. Because the New York Post reviewed all fifty-six movies
distributed by News Corporation, there is quasi-complete separation of
the data, 174 and thus the coefficient of the AFFILIATE variable cannot
be estimated. However, it can be determined that the coefficient is
positive (i.e., greater than zero) and statistically insignificant.1 75 In
addition, because of the quasi-complete separation, all the other

estimated coefficients for that regression should be interpreted as the
estimated coefficients for movies that are not distributed by News
Corporation. 17 6 Because of this interpretation, and because for the New
York Post regression the AFFILIATE x QUALITY interaction variable
has a value of zero for all movies not distributed by a News Corporation
subsidiary, 177 the AFFILIATE x QUALITY variable is not included in
the New York Post regression.
In summary, the empirical results presented in this section indicate
that movie critics are not biased in selecting which movies to review.
All else equal, in general they are no more likely to review affiliated
movies than unaffiliated movies, nor are they more likely to review
higher quality affiliated movies than unaffiliated movies.
2. Bias in the Review Itself
The second question this Article examines is whether critics exhibit a
bias in favor of affiliated movies in the grades they give to the movies.
To help answer this question, Table 6 presents the percentage of
reviews given by each media outlet that are favorable, 17 broken down

174. Quasi-complete separation occurs when some linear function of the explanatory variables
can perfectly predict one possible outcome of the dependent variable. In this particular
regression, one outcome of the dependent variable--a particular movie is not reviewed by the
New York Post--can be fully explained by the AFFILIATE variable; all of the movies that are not
reviewed by the New York Post were also not distributed by a News Corporation subsidiary. See
Paul Allison, Convergence Problems in Logistic Regression, in NUMERICAL ISSUES IN
STATISTICAL COMPUTING FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST 238, 240-51 (Micah Altman et al. eds.,
2004) (discussing quasi-complete separation in logistic regressions and methods for handling the
problem).
175. Id. at 249.
176. Id. The intuition for this is that because all movies distributed by News Corporation
subsidiaries were reviewed by the New York Post, the effect of the other independent variables on
the likelihood that a movie distributed by a News Corporation subsidiary would be reviewed by
the New York Post cannot be determined. Therefore, for the New York Post regression, the
estimated coefficients of these independent variables should be interpreted as the effect on the
likelihood that the New York Post reviews a particular movie that is not distributed by a News
Corporation subsidiary.
177. Recall that AFFILIATE has a value of zero for all movies not distributed by a subsidiary
of the critic's parent company. Thus AFFILIATE x QUALITY--the AFFILIATE variable
multiplied by the QUALITY variable-will also have a value of zero for such movies.
178. Each media outlet uses a different rating system. Ebert & Roeper gives a "Thumbs Up"
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by the parent company of the studio distributing the movie. To make a
fair comparison, only those movies that were reviewed by all three
outlets are included.
TABLE 6:
PERCENTAGE OF REVIEWS THAT ARE POSITIVE

Parent Company of Distributing Studio

Disney

Time Warner

News Corp.

Parent

(92 movies)

(102 movies)

(48 movies)

Ebert & Roeper

Disney

64.7%

48.0%

59.4%

Entertainment Weekly

Time Warner

59.8%

47.1%

45.8%

New York Post

News Corp.

71.7%

48.0%

54.2%

Chi-squared = 4.76, Degrees of freedom=10 (Not Statistically Significant)

Based on Table 6, critics do not appear to favor affiliated movies
over unaffiliated movies. For example, Ebert & Roeper is no more
likely to give favorable reviews to Disney movies than are
EntertainmentWeekly and the New York Post. Similarly, Entertainment
Weekly does not give better reviews to Time Warner movies than do the
other media outlets, and the New York Post does not give better reviews
to News Corporation movies than do the other media outlets. Indeed,
there is no statistically significant difference between the percentage of
reviews, given by the three
media outlets to a particular parent's
17 9
favorable.
are
that
movies,
(favorable review) or a "Thumbs Down" (unfavorable review). Wikipedia: Ebert & Roeper,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ebert &_Roeper (last visited Feb. 6, 2006). Entertainment Weekly
gives a letter grade ranging from A to F; reviews giving at least a B- are generally favorable. See
Rotten Tomatoes: Entertainment Weekly Reviews, http://www.rottentomatoes.com/source-150/
(last visited Feb. 6, 2006) (displaying the letter grades given by Entertainment Weekly to many
films). The New York Post gives a grade ranging from 4 stars to 0 stars; reviews giving at least
2.5 stars are generally favorable.
See Rotten Tomatoes: New York Post Reviews,
http://www.rottentomatoes.com/source-336/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2006) (displaying star grades
given by the New York Post to many films).
179. The null hypothesis tested is that the percentage of reviews of a particular parent's
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Although Table 6 suggests that no bias exists in the grades critics
give to movies, further analysis is necessary to control for other factors
that may be obscuring bias.
For example, Ebert & Roeper,
Entertainment Weekly, and the New York Post each have multiple movie
critics. Thus, a multiple regression analysis is again used in which a
number of quantifiable, explanatory variables are examined that may
affect the probability that a movie receives a particular grade from a
particular critic.
a. Explanatory Variables Defined
i. Quality of Movie
Recall that the variable QUALITY is the average grade given to a
movie by reviewers with no affiliation to the studio that distributed it.
Although critics often disagree about a movie's merit, it is likely that, in
general, the grade a particular critic gives a particular movie will be
positively correlated with the grades that other critics give the movie.
Thus, all else equal, the variable QUALITY should be positively
correlated with the grade that a particular reviewer gives a movie.
ii. Affiliated Movie
As noted above, AFFILIATE is a binary dummy variable that
denotes whether the film is distributed by a studio affiliated with the
media outlet in which the review appears. It has a value of 1 if it is an
affiliated movie and a value of 0 otherwise. If critics are more likely to
give favorable reviews to films of affiliated studios then, all else equal,
AFFILIATE should be positively correlated with the grade that a critic
gives a particular movie.
b. Grade Bias Explored
To test whether these variables help explain the grades critics give
movies, the dependent variable GRADE-the grade a critic gives a
particular movie-is regressed against these two independent variables
and an intercept term. This regression is conducted for each of the
primary critics: Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper of Ebert & Roeper;
Owen Gleiberman and Lisa Schwarzbaum of Entertainment Weekly;
and Jonathan Foreman and Lou Lumenick of the New York Post.
Different critics use different grading systems.
Critics for

movies that are favorable is independent of the media outlet. As noted in Table 6, this null
hypothesis cannot be rejected because the chi-squared statistic is only 4.76, with 10 degrees of
freedom.
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Entertainment Weekly give movies letter grades ranging from A to F;
critics for the New York Post give grades ranging from four stars to zero
stars, in half-star increments. 8° Thus, because the dependent variable
GRADE is an ordered, categorical variable, an ordered logistic
regression is used for the Entertainment Weekly and the New York Post
reviewers. 18 1 On the Ebert & Roeper television show, reviewers Roger
Ebert and Richard Roeper give movies either a "Thumbs Up" (a
positive review) or a "Thumbs Down" (a negative review). 18 Thus,
because the dependent variable GRADE has only two possible values
for them, 1 (for a positive review) or 0 (for a negative review), a simple
logistic regression is used for Ebert and for Roeper. The regression
results are presented in Table 7.

180. Rotten Tomatoes: Entertainment Weekly Reviews, supra note 178; Rotten Tomatoes:
New York Post Reviews, supra note 178.
181. The dependent variable, GRADE, is categorical because only certain values are possible
(A, A-, etc. for Entertainment Weekly and 4 stars, 3.5 stars, etc. for the New York Post), and it is
ordered because these categories are ordered (e.g., an A is a higher grade than an A-, which is
higher than a B+, etc.).
182. Wikipedia: Ebert & Roeper, supra note 178.
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TABLE 7:
DETERMINANTS OF REVIEW GRADE
(LOGIT ESTIMATES; INTERCEPTS NOT DISPLAYED)
QUALITY

AFFILIATE

Roger Ebert

3.4571 ***

0.0268

(612 movies)

(<.0001)

(.9269)

Richard Roeper

1.9619 ***

0.5528 **

(567 movies)

(<.0001)

(.0400)

Owen Gleiberman

2.4320 ***

-0.2757

(364 movies)

(<.0001)

(.2885)

Lisa Schwarzbaum

3.4371 ***

-0.0718

(355 movies)

(<.0001)

(.7791)

Jonathan Foreman

2.9108 ***

0.2010

(367 movies)

(<.0001)

(.6199)

Lou Lumenick

2.6960 ***

0.7199"*

(494 movies)

(<.0001)

(.0315)

Critic

Pseudo R

2

EBERT & ROEPER

ENTERTAINMENT WEEKLY

.1513

NEW YORK POST

* Statistically significant at the 10 percent level
** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level

*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level

Table 7 supports the conclusion that, in general, critics are not biased
in the grades they give movies. Only four of the six critics examined
gave more favorable reviews to affiliated movies, and for only two of
these critics, Richard Roeper and Lou Lumineck, was the result
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statistically significant. 183 Taken as a whole, however, the six critics
are not statistically significantly more likely to give a favorable review
to an affiliated moyie than to an unaffiliated movie. 184 Unlike research

analysts, critics do not exhibit a systematic bias in favor of affiliated
movies. 185
V. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS
This Article's empirical analyses show that movie critics are not
systematically biased in favor of affiliated movies, either in their
selection of which movies to review or in the grades they give the
movies. Thus, movie critics working for the world's largest media
conglomerates appear to be forsaking an opportunity to increase the
profits of their conglomerates. This is particularly interesting given the
efforts, discussed above, of media conglomerates 18to6 use their
subsidiaries to promote the products of other subsidiaries.

In addition, this finding also stands in stark contrast to the systematic
bias of research analysts in favor of current and potential investment
banking clients. 187 It also raises an important question: why do some

conflicts of interest (like those facing research analysts in large financial
conglomerates) result in biased opinions and harm to consumers, while
183. The regression results imply that there is a 48.1% probability that Roeper will give a
favorable review to an unaffiliated movie that has received an equal number of favorable and
unfavorable reviews from other critics, but a 61.7% probability that he will give a favorable
review to a similar quality affiliated movie. Also, the results imply that there is a 46.6%
probability that Lumenick will give a favorable review to an unaffiliated movie that has received
an equal number of favorable and unfavorable reviews from other critics, but a 64.2% probability
that he will give a favorable review to a similar quality affiliated movie.
184. The regression results obtained from using all six critics together are available from the
author.
185. It is possible that a film's genre (comedy, action, etc.) may affect the grade that a
particular critic gives a movie. Critics may differ in the genres they prefer, and these preferences
may be reflected in the grades they give to a particular studio's movies. Thus, a critic might give
higher ratings to affiliated movies because the affiliated studio makes more movies of genres that
that critic prefers rather than because that critic is biased in favor of affiliated movies. For
example, if Roger Ebert likes romantic comedies more than other critics do, and if a greater
percentage of Disney's movies are romantic comedies than are other studios' films, then, all else
equal, he will give better reviews to Disney films, even if he is not biased in favor of Disney. To
control for this factor, the regressions were rerun including dummy variables for the movies'
genres, as listed in the Internet Movie Database. However, controlling for genre did not markedly
change any of the results. The full regression results including genre variables are available from
the author.
186. See sources cited supra note 9 (discussing how conglomerates use their media outlets to
cross-promote products and services provided by other companies within the conglomerate to
maximize the profits of these other businesses).
187. See supra Part III (describing how research analysts' conflicts of interest have lead to
biased research reports).
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others (like those facing movie critics in large media conglomerates) do
not? Determining what factors account for this difference can provide
insight into what causes conflict of interests to actually result in bias
and how regulators can reduce research analysts' bias.
One possible explanation for this Article's finding little evidence of
movie critics' bias may be that high-profile critics may wish to protect
their reputations for being unbiased; all of the critics examined in this
Article work for large media outlets. 188 Research in many fields has
demonstrated that the desire to protect one's reputation can cause a
person to engage in behavior that is against that person's short-term
interest.189
There is evidence that movie critics of the stature examined in this
Article are aware of their reputations for being unbiased. For example,
Roger Ebert and Richard Roeper annually host a film festival on a
Disney cruise and their attendance is highlighted in Walt Disney Cruise
Line's advertising of the cruise. 190 When Ebert was asked by a reporter
if he worried his attendance would create the appearance of a conflict of
interest when he reviewed Disney movies, Ebert replied that he was not
worried about such a perception because in his decades of reviewing
movies he had developed a reputation for being unbiased. 19 1 He noted,
as an example, that he had given very negative reviews to two recent
major Disney movies: Pearl Harbor and The Princess Diaries.192 In
addition, he argued that the importance of maintaining his reputation
would prevent him from being biased: "I have much more to lose than
Disney has to gain.... If anybody perceives that I'm not telling the
''1 3
truth as I see it, I'm out of business. R
Other critics for major publications echo similar professionalism
standards. For example, Owen Gleiberman, a critic for Entertainment

188. Data regarding the reviews of little-known critics is much less accessible.
189. See, e.g., Daniel M. Covitz & Paul Harrison, Testing Conflicts of Interest at Bond
Ratings Agencies with Market Anticipation: Evidence that Reputation Incentives Dominate,
FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FINANCE AND ECONOMICS DISCUSSION SERIES 2003-68, at 1 (2003),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2003/200368/200368pap.pdf
("The
findings strongly indicate that rating changes do not appear to be importantly influenced by rating
agency conflicts of interest, but, rather, suggest rating agencies are motivated primarily by
reputation-related incentives.").
190. Munoz, supra note 36, at F1O.
191. Id. Ebert also stated that before agreeing to host the festival, he and Roeper insisted that
there be no pressure put on them to show Disney films at the festival. Id. In addition, to avoid
the appearance of a conflict of interest, both he and Roeper are not paid to host the film festival.
Jessica Shaw, All Thumbs on Deck, ENT. wKLY., Mar. 14, 2003, at 40.
192. Munoz, supra note 36, at F1O.
193. Id.
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Weekly--and one of the critics examined in this Article-has
complained that "[t]oo many puff critics, quote whores...
and bland,
' 194
lily-livered critics are drowning out the serious critics."
However, reputation concerns are likely not largely responsible for
the lack of bias found in this Article. First, bias would be very difficult
for moviegoers to detect for a number of reasons. As noted above, it is
very unlikely that moviegoers know whether a particular movie's
distributor and the critic's media outlet have the same parent company.
In addition, because each studio distributes only a fraction of the movies
released, the vast majority of a critic's reviews would be unaffected by
bias. 19 5 For these reasons, it is very unlikely that a bias toward
affiliated movies would be detected, absent the types of empirical
analyses used in this Article. The bias would affect only a small
percentage of the critic's reviews and because the public is unaware of
which movies are affiliated with a particular critic, the public would not
be aware that it was bias in favor of affiliated movies.
In addition, reputation concerns by critics would be unable to prevent
unintentional bias. At most law schools, professors grade exams
blind-i.e., without knowing who wrote the exam-in part to avoid
unintentional bias in grading. 196 Similarly, a critic may subconsciously
look more favorably on a movie because it is distributed by an affiliated
studio.
Finally, the fact that similar reputation concerns did not prevent bias
in research analysts, also suggests that reputation concerns would not be
sufficient to prevent bias in movie critics. Research analysts' bias
occurred despite the fact that analysts' reputations for providing
accurate forecasts can be important to their success. 197 In addition, the
accuracy of analysts' forecasts can be objectively measured, unlike the
accuracy of movie reviews. If a research analyst recommends a
particular stock or issues an estimate of a company's quarterly earnings,
then it will be clear in hindsight whether the analyst was correct, and his
194. Shaw, supra note 37, at Al.
195. For example, Time Warner studios distributed only 11.4% of the movies examined in
this Article, the most of any parent company.
196. Judith G. Greenberg, Erasing Race From Legal Education, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
51, 69 (1994).
197. Harrison Hong & Jeffrey D. Kubik, Analyzing the Analysts: Career Concernsand Biased
Earnings Forecasts, 58 J. FIN. 313, 345-48 (2003) (empirical study finding that forecasting
accuracy affects research analysts' career success). Hong and Kubik's study also found that for
stocks underwritten by analysts' employers, forecasting accuracy has less impact-and optimism
in the forecasts has a greater impact-on career advancement. Id. This demonstrates that

conflicts of interest can outweigh an analyst's concern for having a reputation of being an
accurate forecaster. Id.
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or her reputation could be affected accordingly. In contrast, a critic's
judgment regarding the quality of a particular movie is inherently
subjective, so although a critic might hold a minority view regarding
certain movies,
one cannot objectively conclude that the critic was
198
inaccurate.
The primary explanations for the differences in bias exhibited by
movie critics and research analysts are differences in the structures of
the organizations in which they work, and differences in the financial
incentives that they face. These differences also suggest that many of
the recent reforms targeted at research analysts are likely to be
successful in reducing analysts' bias.
As discussed above, these reforms fall into three categories: (1)
reforms designed to make research analysts independent, especially
from their firms' investment bankers; (2) reforms designed to eliminate
research analysts' financial interests in the effect of their reports on the
companies they cover; and (3) reforms that require disclosure of
research analysts' conflicts of interest. 19 9 This Article's empirical
analyses suggest that the first two sets of reforms are
likely to reduce
20 0
unnecessary.
are
requirements
disclosure
the
bias, but
A. IncreasingResearch Analysts' Independence
The first type of reform aims to increase research analysts'
198. A counterargument could be made that reputation would have a stronger effect on movie
critics than on research analysts because the quality of an analyst's forecast is less verifiable than
is the quality of a critic's review. For example, unlike a movie review, an analyst's forecast of a
company's earnings may end up being inaccurate for reasons beyond the analyst's control, such
as due to an unforeseeable slowdown in the economy. Ultimately, the question of whether a
research analyst's erroneous forecast harms the analyst's reputation more than a flawed movie
review harms a critic's reputation is an empirical question beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, it is not obvious that a critic's reputation would be harmed more. A viewer who
disagrees with a critic's review might attribute part of that disagreement simply to differences in
taste, not to a critic's incompetence or bias. In addition, people who regret having relied on a
critic's review will only have lost a couple of hours of their time and the cost of their movie
tickets; on the other hand, investors who regret relying on an analyst's research reports may have
lost large sums of money.
199. See supra notes 100-127 and accompanying text (listing the NYSE and NASD rules
approved by the SEC).
200. Although this Article provides support for many of the structural reforms, it does not
necessarily endorse the view that these reforms should come from a particular source, such as the
SEC. For example, the independence of movie critics from affiliated movie studios has not been
imposed from outside the media industry. In addition, as discussed above, some of the reforms
directed at research analysts came into effect through the global settlement or were even adopted
voluntarily by firms. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text (describing reforms agreed
to in the global settlement); Gasparino & Opdyke, supra note 84 and accompanying text (noting
that Merrill Lynch voluntarily adopted a policy prohibiting its research analysts from owning
stock in companies that they cover).
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independence from their firms' investment bankers. As discussed
above, research analysts gave more favorable coverage to companies
with which their employer had or hoped to secure investment banking
business. This is unsurprising in light of the pressure on these research
analysts to write positive reports about such companies. For example,
companies threatened to end lucrative investment banking relationships
with the employers of research analysts who wrote unfavorable reports
about them.20 l Sometimes these threats resulted in a particular research
20 2
analyst being removed from covering the complaining company.
There were also other sources of pressure to produce biased
recommendations. Research analysts often worked under the
supervision of the investment banking department. 2 03 In addition, some
research analysts' compensation was directly based in part on the
investment banking business that they helped bring in. 2 04 In fact,
investment banking departments' pitches for business from a company
sometimes included a promise that a particularly well-known research
analyst at the investment bank's firm would cover the company's
2 0 Sometimes the research analyst would even attend these
stock.205
pitches.206
The situation is very different for movie critics working for media
conglomerates. There is no evidence that these critics or their parent
companies view part of the critics' jobs as the promotion of affiliated
movies. Also, critics' supervisors are editors of the media outlet for
which they work, not executives of affiliated studios. 20 7 In addition,
critics' compensation is not based on how affiliated movies perform at
the box office. 20 8 For all these reasons, critics do not face the great
pressure to give favorable reviews to affiliated movies that research
analysts felt to give favorable coverage to actual or potential investment
201. See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn, Frank Quattrone'sHeavy Hand, FORTUNE, Dec. 30, 2002, at 78
(noting that the Chief Executive Officer of EarthLink threatened to move Earthlink's investment

banking business from Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) because of CSFB's research reports on
Earthlink).
202. Id.
203. See, e.g., Landon Thomas Jr., U.S. Accuses a Top Banker of Obstruction, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2003, at Cl (noting that Frank Quattrone, while he was global head of technology

banking for Credit Suisse First Boston, also had "direct control over his research analysts").
204.

Smith, supra note 64, at Cl; U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note

3.
205. See, e.g., Dinallo Affidavit, supra note 73, at 24 (indicating that to secure an investment
banking deal with GoTo.com, Merrill Lynch investment bankers promised that famous Merrill

Lynch research analyst Henry Blodget would begin covering GoTo.com's stock).
206. Smith, supra note 64, at Cl.
207. Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 55.
208. Id.
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banking clients.
This contrast between research analysts and movie critics also
indicates the importance of an individual having a personal stake in the
creation of bias for a conflict of interest to result in actual bias. This
Article's findings indicate that, to create bias, it is not enough that that
individual's parent company benefits from bias; instead the bias must
also benefit the individual research analyst or critic personally.
Research analysts who gave negative coverage to investment banking
clients risked reducing their own compensation. However, movie critics
who give unfavorable reviews to affiliated movies face no such
sanctions. The result of these differing incentives appears to be that
stock recommendations were often biased but movie reviews were not.
This strongly suggests that reforms that increase research analysts'
independence from
investment bankers should reduce bias in research
20 9
reports.
analysts'
B. EliminatingResearchAnalysts' Stake in How Their Reports Affect
the Companies They Cover
Another way that research analysts can have a personal financial
stake is by actually owning a financial interest in the companies they
cover. Obviously, a research analyst with a financial stake in a
company the analyst covers will have a conflict of interest. For
example, if the analyst owns stock in a company, the analyst will have a
direct personal financial incentive to not issue a negative report on the
company because the report may adversely affect the value of the
analyst's stockholding. 2 1° Thus, the second type of reform is directed at
eliminating research analysts' personal financial interests in how their
coverage affects the companies they cover. As discussed above, these
reforms consist of rules limiting the types and timing of transactions
that analysts can make in the securities of the companies they cover.
This Article's finding of little evidence of bias by movie critics
209. Some have argued that, because sell-side research analysts' reports suffer from a public
good problem (i.e., research analysts are unable to capture the full benefit of their research
through marketplace transactions), preventing investment banking departments from subsidizing
research analysts will result in too little research being produced. Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch,
How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher FinancingProposalfor Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE
L.J. 269, 283-92 (2003). However, as discussed in the present Article, the subsidization results
in biased research that is harmful to investors. See supra Part II (discussing the conflicts of
interest facing research analysts and the effects of these conflicts on investors who rely upon
research analysts' reports). For a creative approach to subsidizing research without using
investment banking revenue, see Choi & Fisch, supra, proposing a shareholder voucher system to
fund research analysts and other securities intermediaries.
210. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, supra note 3.
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suggests that these reforms are also warranted. Unlike some research
analysts, movie critics do not have direct financial interests in the
movies they review. Some critics are involved in the production of
particular movies, but these critics do not review movies with which
they are involved. 2 11 For example, the Ethics Policy of the Chicago
Film Critics Association explicitly prohibits critics from "participating
(regardless
of compensation) in productions that will be reviewed by the
2 12
'

critic.

The importance of having a personal financial stake in the creation of
bias is further illustrated by the effect of press junkets on some movie
critics. As discussed above, studios give many critics who attend these
junkets free airfare, expensive hotel rooms and meals, spending money,
and access to movie stars.
In addition, studios have sometimes
temporarily blackballed critics, who were critical of the studios'
movies. 2 13 As discussed above, there is at least strong anecdotal
evidence that some regular junket attendees respond to these incentives
2 14
by making positive statements about the movies shown at the junkets.
Regular junket attendees often provide the positive blurbs that a pear in
advertising for movies that received widespread poor reviews.21?
The behavior of some junket attendees provides more support for the
conclusion that preventing critics from having a personal financial
interest in the creation of bias is a key to preventing bias. Similarly, it
indicates that eliminating research analysts' personal financial stake in
how their reports affect the stock price2 of
the companies they cover is a
16
key to eliminating bias in their reports.
C. DisclosureRequirements
This final type of recent reform requires the public disclosure of the

211. Telephone Interview with Dann Gire, supra note 55.
212. CHICAGO FILM CRITICS ASS'N, ETHICS POLICY OF THE CHICAGO FILM CRITICS AsS'N
(on file with the author).
213. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing how critics Roger Ebert and Gene
Siskel were banned temporarily from 20th Century Fox screenings).
214. Hays, supra note 41 ("How do you qualify as a Quote Whore? You give good quote.
Freebie junketeers sometimes scribble down words of praise and pass them to publicists right

there at the junket.").
215. Welkos & Abramowitz, supra, note 51.
216. It is also possible that, as a group, the personalities of people who choose to become
movie critics may not be the same as those who choose to become research analysts. For
example, as a group, research analysts may be more motivated by financial reward than are movie
critics. If this is true, then it would be even more necessary to ensure that research analysts not
have personal financial incentives to produce biased research reports than to ensure that movie
critics lack personal financial incentives to produce biased movie reviews.
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conflicts of interests that research analysts face.
Disclosure
requirements may serve two purposes. First, disclosure may make it
less likely that investors will rely upon biased reports. Disclosure alerts
investors to a research analyst's conflict of interests so that they may
view the analyst's report with more skepticism. 2 17 Second, because
investors will be aware of the conflicts, disclosure may encourage
research analysts to not be biased, because disclosure may cause their
2 18
recommendations and forecasts to be viewed more suspiciously.
However, this Article's results indicate that the disclosure
requirements are unnecessary. As noted above, movie critics do not
disclose when they are reviewing a movie distributed by a studio with
which they are affiliated. Despite this lack of disclosure, movie critics
do not show systematic bias toward affiliated movies. Because critics
work independently from those who distribute the affiliated movies, and
because critics lack a personal financial interest in the success of
affiliated movies, they do not exhibit the bias displayed by research
analysts. Thus no disclosure of movie critics' conflicts of interests
appears necessary.
This also suggests that requiring research analysts to disclose their
conflicts of interest would be unnecessary if the other reforms are
successful in keeping analysts independent from their firms' investment
bankers and in keeping analysts from having a personal stake in how
their coverage affects the securities of the companies they cover.
This conclusion is especially important because other research has
shown that disclosure may have unintended, undesirable effects. 2 19 One
such effect is that, if forced to disclose their conflicts of interest,
research analysts may react strategically by making forecasts and
recommendations exhibiting even greater bias. 220 For example, if an
analyst believes that disclosure of the firm's investment banking
relationship will cause investors to discount the analyst's
recommendation to purchase a particular stock, the analyst might
intentionally give an even more exaggerated recommendation to offset
this discounting. In other words, "[w]hile disclosure might warn an

217. Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, The Dirt on Coming Clean:
PerverseEffects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2005).
218. Id. at 5-6.
219. These potential undesirable effects, and the psychological studies underpinning them, are
thoroughly discussed in Daylian M. Cain, George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, Coming Clean
but Playing Dirty: The Shortcomings of Disclosure as a Solution to Conflicts of Interest, in
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BUSINESS, LAW, MEDICINE, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 104 (Don A. Moore et al. eds., 2005).
220. Cain etal., supra note 217, at 6-7.
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audience2 2to
1 cover its ears, it may also encourage advisors to yell even
louder."

In addition, disclosure might increase bias by making some research
analysts feel that disclosure gives them an ethical green light to give
biased advice. 222 An analyst may believe that because disclosure warns
investors to beware of bias, the analyst is relieved of the ethical
responsibility of being unbiased. The results of some psychology
experiments indicate that this concern is justified.22 3

A related problem of disclosure is that it may reduce the likelihood
that policy-makers take other steps to actually reduce or eliminate the

existence of the conflict of interest. Because disclosure warns
consumers to be wary of the advice, disclosure may be perceived as
reducing policy-makers' responsibility for any harm resulting from the
conflict, and thus may lessen the political2pressure
on policymakers to
4
reduce or eliminate the conflict of interest. 7
In addition, investors may not react to the disclosure in the way that

the SEC intends them to. For example, if analysts disclose their
conflicts of interest, investors might perceive this very act of disclosure
as evidence that the analysts are honest, and thus might lead to even
greater reliance 2 25on the conflicted analysts'
forecasts and

recommendations.

Also, even if investors do react to disclosure by being more skeptical
of conflicted research analysts' advice, for several reasons investors are
very unlikely to discount sufficiently that conflicted advice. First, there
is no reason to believe that investors are aware of the amount by which
conflicted analysts' forecasts should be discounted.
In fact,
221. Cain et al., supra note 219, at 115.
222. Id. at 115-16.
223. Donald G. Dutton & Robert A. Lake, Threat of Own Prejudice and Reverse
Discrimination in Interracial Situations, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 94 (1973)
(persons who were falsely told that they had exhibited a racist reaction to a particular stimulus
were more likely to subsequently take actions to demonstrate that they are not racist); Benoit
Monin & Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 33, 40 (2001) (persons who were given the opportunity to show they are not
prejudiced were more likely to subsequently take actions that are prejudiced).
224. Cain et al., supra note 219, at 107-08.
225. Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL.
21,21 (1995).
Three decades of research in social psychology have shown that many of the mistakes
people make are of a kind: When people observe behavior, they often conclude that the
person who performed the behavior was predisposed to do so-that the person's
behavior corresponds to the person's unique dispositions-and they draw such
conclusions even when a logical analysis suggests they should not.
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psychological research indicates that people are likely to underestimate
the bias resulting from conflicts of interest. 22 6
Second, other
psychological experiments have long demonstrated that because of an
anchoring and insufficient adjustment effect, people will give too much
weight to advice, even if it is disclosed to them that the advice is
randomly generated.2 2 7
In addition, other experiments have
demonstrated the failure of evidentiary discreditation; people have

difficulty disregarding information (such as stock forecasts that
228 they
have seen), even if they learn that the information is inaccurate.

The combination of disclosure requirements causing analysts'
research reports possibly to be even more biased, and investors being

unable to sufficiently discount the research reports for this bias, means
that investors might even be made worse off by disclosure requirements.
Indeed, a recent experiment found that when forced to disclose their

conflict of interest, conflicted advisors' advice was much more biased
than when they did not have to disclose their conflict. 22 9 Although the
receivers of the advice discounted the advice in response to the
disclosure, they did so insufficiently. 230 As a result, overall, the
receivers of the advice were worse off than they would have been if the
conflict had not been disclosed.2 3 1
These possible adverse effects of disclosure support the conclusion
that the reforms directed at research analysts should focus on reducing

their conflicts
of interest rather than on mandating the disclosure of the
2 32
conflicts.

226. See Cain et al., supra note 219, at 113-14 and the studies cited therein ("Estimating the
extent to which advice has been biased by an advisor's conflict of interest necessitates estimating
the effect of a situational inducement on behavior; and such situational effects generally tend to
be underestimated.").
227. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1124-25 (1974).
228. Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction:
Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 137 (1994).
229. The experiment involved persons ("estimators") who had to guess from a distance the
amount of money that was in a jar of coins. They received advice from other persons
("advisors") who were given the opportunity to more closely study the jar. However, the advisors
had a conflict of interest because the higher the estimators guessed, the more compensation the
advisors received. Cain et al., supra note 217, at 9.
230. Id. at 14-17.
231. Id. at 18.
232. Cain et al., supra note 219, at 114 ("In sum, a substantial body of research suggests that
it is unlikely that [receivers of advice] will be able to use disclosures of conflict of interest to
correctly discount advice from biased sources, even if those disclosures are honest and
thorough.").
Despite its problems, disclosure remains a popular approach to dealing with
conflicts of interest. This is likely, at least partly, because it is often the preferred remedy of
policymakers and the persons with the conflicts because disclosure requires little disruption of the
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VI. CONCLUSION

Conglomerates have the opportunity to exploit synergies among their
businesses to offer better products or services or lower prices.
However, they also can create conflicts of interests for their employees.
This Article has examined two industries in which certain professionals
face similar conflicts of interests because of the conglomerates in which
they work.
Millions of investors rely on the investment advice of research
analysts who work in brokerages. However, those research analysts
whose employers are part of financial institutions that also have
investment banking departments face a conflict of interest because
giving positive recommendations regarding particular stocks can help
these financial conglomerates secure lucrative investment banking
business.
Similarly, millions of consumers rely on movie critics for sincere
advice regarding which movies to see. However, those movie critics
whose employers are part of media conglomerates that also own movie
studios have a conflict of interest because giving positive reviews of
those studios' movies can cause more people to see the movies.
Despite the similarities in the conflicts of interest facing these two
sets of professionals, each has responded very differently to the
conflicts. Previous research has demonstrated that research analysts'
reports have been biased by their conflict of interest. However, this
Article's empirical analyses have found no systematic bias in movie
critics' reviews.
The difference can be attributed to the organizational structure and
financial incentives facing movie critics differing significantly from
those faced by many research analysts. Critics are not supervised by
studio executives, nor do critics personally profit from how much
money their reviews make for affiliated studios. On the other hand,
many research analysts were being supervised by their firms'
investment bankers, compensated partly upon how much investment
banking business they helped bring in, and were able to personally
financially benefit from how their reports affected the prices of the
securities they covered.
This Article's findings provide guidance for policymakers tasked
with controlling conflicts of interest. Their focus should be on reducing
the existence of the conflicts of interests, not on publicly disclosing
status quo and places on others the primary responsibility for dealing with the consequences of
the conflicts. Cain et al., supra note 217, at 2-3.
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them. This conclusion is especially important given recent research
showing that, at least in some contexts, disclosure can harm those it is
intended to protect.
This conclusion also provides support for many of the rules and
regulations the Securities Exchange Commission and others have
recently imposed on research analysts and their employers. Because
many of these reforms will make the organizational structure and
financial incentives facing research analysts more like those facing
movie critics, this Article provides support for the conclusion that such
reforms will likely reduce analysts' bias. However, it also suggests that
the reforms that mandate public disclosure of the analysts' conflicts of
interests are unnecessary. Movie reviews do not disclose when the
critic is reviewing an affiliated movie, yet these reviews are still not
biased.

